Ranj Alaaldin

Middle East and Arab world commentary, analysis and news

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Unsung heroes of #Iraq

Posted by ranjalaaldin on January 27, 2010
Posted in: Uncategorized. Tagged: Iraq. Leave a Comment

Out there in Iraq, amidst the bombings and killings are Iraqis risking
their lives so western journalists do their job and relay information
back to us in the comfort of our homes and offices. Below is a moving
tribute to one of probably many unsung heroes.

—–

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article7003347.ece

Farewell to Yasser, The Times’s driver: an unsung hero of the Iraq war
James Hider, The Times

Another day, another round of bombs in Baghdad. A blip that barely
registers in the news after so many years of bloodshed, and quickly
blurs into the endless images of familiar carnage.

Except this day was different for me and many of my colleagues who
have covered the Iraq war. This was the day that my friend Yasser
vanished in that inevitable cloud of grey smoke that you see on your
television screens or newspaper pages.

Yasser was The Times’s driver for the past seven years, since the fall
of the regime that he had hated so much. He joined the newspaper
pretty much the same week I did, and together we worked through the
bloodiest periods of the war. Yasser — whose surname I cannot put in
print, even now, because of the danger to his brother, who also works
as a Times driver — was one of the thousands of Iraqis who have made
the media coverage of the war possible: uncredited, unsung heroes of a
war most people would rather forget.

He had survived some terrifying episodes, from being “ethnically
cleansed” with his family by Sunni insurgents from their home in 2006,
when they moved into our hotel but did not stop working, to blocking
the road with his car as a vehicle full of armed kidnappers tried to
abduct a Times reporter one evening near the Tigris river. He saved my
life and the lives of colleagues at the risk of his own, only to step
out of The Times office at exactly the wrong moment on Monday, the
moment when a suicide car bomber fought his way into the compound and
blew himself up.

Over the years Yasser and his brother became close to all of us: they
would be waiting at the airport when we flew in to drive us along the
notorious Route Irish road when it was still a daily death trip; they
would hug us like brothers when we left, always with a promise to
return. But they did not just drive us into battle zones: they bought
us cakes on our birthdays, invited us, when it was safe, to their home
for meals cooked by their mother. Through the years we went to their
weddings, saw Yasser become a proud father of two girls and, recently,
hope for a better future for the country.

Yasser was a kind and funny man who had seen too much misery but
retained his ability to crack a wicked joke. When we met, he told that
me he had learnt English when training as a vet, but had never
practised because he did not like any animals except for sheep. He was
sweet and courteous, and called my girlfriend “Prince” until we
pointed out that it was a male name. He cackled at his own mistake.

On one of my first outings with him through the lawless streets, he
suddenly executed a U-turn through gridlocked traffic and sped off: he
had spotted a gang of looters pulling people from the cars ahead,
stabbing them and stealing their vehicles. Another time, when we were
grabbed by the notorious al-Mahdi Army militia, masked gunmen dragged
me and my translator off to an unknown destination in Sadr City. As a
Shia from the area, Yasser could have driven off and no one would have
blamed him: instead, I was hugely relieved to spot him through the
rear window belting after us. He stayed with me until we managed to
negotiate our release.

The last time I was in Baghdad, almost a year ago, Yasser made me
promise to return. I will, very soon, but too late to see his smiling
face. He was buried by his family yesterday in the Shia holy city of
Najaf.

Instead, I will be greeted by his inconsolable brother, who was too
devastated to do anything more than cry when I phoned him yesterday. I
cried with him, because Yasser was not just another faceless
statistic. He was a friend and a heroic colleague who will be missed
forever.

Fake magic wands sold to Iraqis

Posted by ranjalaaldin on January 26, 2010
Posted in: Uncategorized. Tagged: Iraq. Leave a Comment

See video below on the fake “wands” sold to Iraq for the purposes of detecting bombs. Iraq has spent more than $85 million on these wands. Iraqi government spokesman Ali Dabbagh yesterday said they’ll investigate and if the products are found ineffective – which they are – then they’ll sue. It will be interesting to see how victims of recent bomb attacks and their families will react, whether they’ll be compensated is a matter too.

More on banning of candidates

Posted by ranjalaaldin on January 23, 2010
Posted in: Uncategorized. Tagged: Iraq. Leave a Comment

My article below appeared in the Guardian and provided an update on the developments but also critically assessed US Vice-President Joe Biden’s proposal to postpone the ban for until after the elections, so that only those so-called Baathists who won would be investigated.

Confusion surrounds the whole Shia-Sunni aspect of the banning of 511 parliamentary candidates. Faraj Al-Hayder, head of the IHEC, has said the number on the list is “roughly” equal, while Reuters reports here there are more Shias than Sunnis. The article says that it is predominantly Sunni.

In any case, I was one of the first to reject the sectarian colourings observers were giving the whole affair when it started and referred to the fact that Shias as well as Kurds are included on the list. Having said this, the most significant of those banned is Salah Mutlaq, a Sunni. It is this that prompted the initial, somewhat hyperbolic, reactions that turned, in essence, the molehill into a mountain and that threatened/threatens to derail the elections.

Iraq’s new election fiasco

The banning of more than 500 candidates will severely test the upcoming Iraqi elections’ legitimacy

A few months ago the stage was set in Iraq for what looked like a much-improved exercise in democracy where ethnic and sectarian boundaries would be crossed, to some degree, in the electoral process. Over the past few weeks, however, the banning of 511 predominantly Sunni candidates, and the intense bickering that followed, have cast a shadow over the forthcoming elections. Barred candidates have the opportunity to appeal, but the appeal process for so many candidates could take longer than the two months left between now and the elections.

Diplomatic efforts by western governments are accordingly in full gear, with concerns centring on instability and what this could mean for the withdrawal of troops later this year, as well as the increased Iranian influence that could result from eliminating any strongly nationalistic, anti-Iran elements from the Iraqi parliament.

In an effort to resolve the crisis, the UN called for the list to be discarded and, not surprisingly, was dismissed almost immediately. A more constructive proposal came from US vice-president Joseph Biden and his team of Middle East advisers. Biden suggested that the list be set aside until after the elections, so that only candidates who are elected would have to be examined for Baathist ties. His suggestion may have been the result of the lobbying efforts of Ayad Allawi, who this week visited Barham Salih, the prime minister of the Kurdistan region and a prominent ally of Washington in Iraq. Allawi heads the Iraqi National Movement, which had at least 70 members banned and which includesSalah al-Mutlaq, a key Sunni player whose banning is the most controversial of all.

Reports suggest Biden’s proposal could be taken on board. It has not yet been rejected by the Iraqis. However, if banning the candidates is a disastrous move (and the US clearly believes it is) then Biden’s proposal merely postpones the disaster. Allowing suspected Baathists or ex-Baathists to be voted into parliament, and then ejecting them against the wishes of the electorate could have far more adverse consequences than barring them from the elections from the start.

The official western policy in Iraq has been to let Iraqis take care of Iraqi affairs. As a result, the US, UN and EU have largely watched from the sidelines as disputes over Kirkuk, oil and power sharing continue.

From time to time, though, they do give an effective nudge. The election law mayhem a few months ago saw Iraq’s groups at a deadlock over controversial details of the 7 March elections, which threatened to derail US withdrawal plans. But then the US, along with the UK, stepped in andparliament finally passed the law. Although it was returned to parliament for modification straight afterwards, parliament was quick in passing it.

Whether western input will improve things or make them worse this time round is not clear. Significant and prominent Sunni entities are still contesting the elections and, despite the ban, Sunni resentment is not what it was in 2005 when most boycotted the elections. The question is whether the US is stoking the sectarianism that some Sunnis have associated with the debacle – to the extremists’ advantage, since it may end up taking the dispute away from the Iraqi political and legal arenas and into the street, where it then becomes contested in a violent and communal fashion. A largely Iraqi problem will then become not so much an Iraqi one, but a US one.

Iraq’s electoral commission bars 500 candidates

Posted by ranjalaaldin on January 15, 2010
Posted in: Uncategorized. Tagged: Iraq. 2 comments

BAGHDAD — Iraq’s electoral commission on Thursday barred 500 candidates from running in March’s parliamentary election, including a prominent Sunni lawmaker, in a decision that is sure to deepen Iraq’s sectarian divides.

Hamdia al-Hussaini, a commissioner on the Independent High Electoral Commission, said the commission made the decision after receiving the list from a parliament committee that vets candidates for ties to Saddam Hussein’s outlawed Baath party.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/14/AR2010011401912.html

#Iraq Sentences 11 Terror Suspects to Death for Bloody August 19 Explosions

Posted by ranjalaaldin on January 14, 2010
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Iraq Sentences 11 Terror Suspects to Death for Bloody August 19 Explosions

http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/Iraq-Sentences-11-Terror-Suspects-to-Death-for-Bloody-August-19-Explosions–81545512.html

An Iraqi court has sentenced 11 men to death for the massive truck
bombings in Baghdad last August that killed more than 100 people.
Those convicted will now have a month to appeal their sentences.

The sentencing of 11 suspects to be hanged for the bloody car bombings
that ravaged Iraq’s foreign and finance ministries last August appears
to be a clear signal that the government is reacting firmly against
terrorism, less than two months before parliamentary elections are due
to be held.

Close to 100 people were killed and more than 500 more were wounded in
the bombings.

Two more devastating attacks in last October and December also left
hundreds dead and wounded, further eroding the government’s
credibility in maintaining security.

The spokesman for Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council, Judge Abdul-Sattar
Bayrkdar, said that the 11 were given a fair trial:

He says authorities made sure that conditions were conducive to a fair
trial, regarding the media and the presence of attorneys for the
defense, as well as presenting evidence from the inquest to the
accused. He states that the criminal court set the dates of the
hearings from Dec. 29 to January 14, after making all the needed
preparations. The verdict, he adds, was to hang 11 of the accused men,
condemned for the August explosions targeting the foreign and finance
ministries, in accordance with article 4:1 of Iraq’s terrorism law.

Judge Bayrkdar told Iraqi TV that evidence, including explosives,
detonators and ready-to-deploy car-bombs, were uncovered by
investigators in the locations where the 11 were arrested.

Shortly after the August bombings, Iraqi TV aired what it called a
“confession” by an alleged member of Saddam Hussein’s former Baath
Party. The man calling himself Wisam Ali Khazem Ibrahim confessed that
he was a former Baath member and police officer in the old regime and
indicated that the bombings financed by top Baath official, based in
Syria.

Both Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Foreign Minister Houshiar
Zubeiri have accused both Syria and the Baath party of playing a role
in the bombings. Damascus denies the charges.

Iraq is preparing for nationwide parliamentary elections in March, and
officials have warned that insurgents trying to disrupt the vote could
launch attacks as the election nears.

Article on Salah Mutlaq ban

Posted by ranjalaaldin on January 13, 2010
Posted in: Uncategorized. Tagged: Iraq. Leave a Comment

Ba’ath saga haunts Iraq’s future
Guardian
Ranj Alaaldin

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jan/13/baath-iraq-debaathification-elections

De-Ba’athification is derailing the national reconciliation process, but Sunnis will not necessarily chose to boycott elections

The Iraqi government is treading a fine line after its Accountability and Justice commission (also known as the “de-Ba’athification” commission) moved to bar a prominent Sunni politician, Salah al-Mutlaq, and 14 others from contesting the national elections in March because of their ties with the outlawed Ba’ath party.

Mutlaq heads the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, which in last year’s provincial elections performed well in Sunni-dominated areas. He is considered a key player, and for the forthcoming elections has joined forces with fellow former Ba’athist and former Iraqi premier Ayad Allawi, along with current vice-president Tariq al-Hashimi. Both command a significant following and the grouping, named the Iraqi National Movement (INM), should be a force to be reckoned with, especially ifprevious election results are anything to go by.

It is no surprise then that Sunni officials consider this another plot by the Shia-dominated government to outmanoeuvre and marginalise the Sunnis, who this time round are expected to come out and vote en masse and, therefore, threaten the dominance of Iraq’s other major groups.

The whole affair may indeed seem like a sinister anti-Sunni campaign in anticipation of the coming elections. After all, Mutlaq’s Ba’ath history has been known all along, and never stopped him from contesting the 2005 elections. INM officials have linked the decision to Iranian foreign minister Manuchehr Mottaki’s visit to Baghdad, just one day before it was made.

Prolific Iraq commentator Reidar Visser refers to the “selective de-Ba’athification” process being pursued in Iraq, given that historically, he notes, the Shias and Sunnis alike co-operated with the old regime in their millions. He criticises the Iraqi government for singling out Sunni political opponents as Ba’athists and for silently co-opting political friends without mentioning their Ba’athist ties at all.

But while Visser’s argument holds water to some extent, it is important to draw a line between those Ba’athists who were deeply embedded within the regime through and throughout (that is Mutlaq) and those that may have served the regime’s opportunistic endeavours at any given point and who were not, therefore, deep-rooted regime loyalists even if they thought they were (that is the Shia tribes, Kurdish Jash, and so on).

Moreover, the list issued by the commission also includes non-Sunni Arab groups. It includes, for instance, Jawhar al-Harki, a Kurd who calls himself a former adviser to Saddam; it also includes Arshad al-Zibari, again a Kurd who has been cited as a close friend and ally of Saddam’s. Both are allied with the al-Hadba group in Mosul, which controls the provincial council there. Al-Hadba, dominated and funded by Ba’ath loyalists, is also part of the INM. Curiously, the commission does not ban them outright.

Historically, the Ba’athists have a habit of resurfacing and exploiting state and military structures, and there is still a significant group of Ba’athists within and/or beyond Iraq’s borders that continue to prepare and mount terrorist atrocities. What is difficult to determine is whether those seemingly reconciled Ba’athists have truly changed their colours, and herein lays the concerns of not just Iraq’s Shias and Kurds but also of former British ambassador to Iraq John Jenkins, who last week gave evidence to the Iraq inquiry. Further, Mutlaq himself has courted factions that still support the Ba’ath party, suggesting it continues to be a key component of Iraqi society.

What is not clear at this point is how the Arab street feels, an important factor in determining how the Sunni electorate will react on 7 March. Iraq’s other dominant Sunni groups, such as the Anbar Awakening Council, led by Abu Risha, and the Iraqi Accord Front coalition, which used to include Tariq al-Hashimi, have so far provided a relatively muted response. They may see no reason to boycott the elections; the latter took part in the 2005 election despite a Sunni boycott, while the former will point out that Mutlaq himself decided to contest the 2005 election while they, along with the rest of the Awakening forces, were busy fighting coalition forces.

Mutlaq’s coalition partners in the INM, made up mostly of pragmatists, are also unlikely to withdraw from the political process, despite threatening to do so. Further, it is hoped the Sunnis have largely left, or hope to leave behind their violent, exclusionary past in the new Iraq. It is difficult to imagine that they would make the same strategic mistakes.

Still, Iraq’s electoral commission will decide whether to press ahead with the ban after it has received the commission’s formal report. Suspected parties can then launch an appeal. However, the saga has already hurt the process of national reconciliation, imperative for long-term stability and US withdrawal plans, and as a result the damage may have already been done.

More on decision to ban #Iraq parties; full list provided

Posted by ranjalaaldin on January 9, 2010
Posted in: Uncategorized. Tagged: Iraq. 2 comments

Yesterday the Accountability and Justice Commission (also known as the “de-Baathification commission”) moved to bar prominent Sunni politician Salah al-Mutlaq from contesting the country’s national elections in March. This may have disastrous ramifications for national reconciliation, marginalise the Sunnis once again, and prove disastrous for broader Iraqi politics and security, as well as US plans for withdrawal which depends on stability in the country.

Though this may seem like an entirely anti-Sunni campaign in anticipation of the coming elections, the list does include other groups including Kurd Arshad al-Zibari of The [Iraqi] Kurdistan Justice Party. Arshad al-Zibari is considered a discredited “Jash” because of his involvement with the Baath government. Reports suggest he was a close ally of Saddam, a friend, and a member of his security group.

He is also part of the al-Hadba group in Mosul which controls the provincial council there. Al-Hadba is dominated by Baath loyalists; curiously, the commission does not ban them outright.

The full list of those the commission seeks to ban – a total of 15 – is provided below. Iraq’s electoral commission will decide within days whether to ban them, after it has received the Justice committee’s formal report, and  suspected parties can then launch an appeal before a panel of three judges appointed specifically to deal with electoral matters.

1. The Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, headed by Salih al-Mutlaq

“2. The Iraqi National Unity Grouping, headed by Nihru Abd-al-Karim

“3. The Solution Movement, headed by Jamal al-Karbuli

“4. The Iraqi Republican Grouping, headed by Sa’d Asim al-Janabi

“5. The Al-Rafidayn National Trend, headed by Husayn al-Safi

“6. The Iraqi Al-Sawa’id Grouping, headed by Salih al-Sa’idi

“7. The Our Sons Bloc, headed by Abdallah al-Wahb

“8. The National Council of the Grouping of Iraqi Tribes, headed by Mustafa al-Juburi

“9. The Iraqi Social Movement, headed by Ahmad al-Rakan

“10. Sa’d al-Juburi List, headed by Sa’d al-Juburi

“11. The Kurdistan Justice Party, Arshad al-Zibari

“12. The All of Iraq Bloc, headed by Jawhar al-Harki

“13. The People’s Trend, headed by Ali al-Sajri

“14. The Iraqi Resurrection Party, headed by Abd-al-Jabbar al-Khazraji

“15. The National Change Plan, headed by Ali Khalifah”

British troops in #Iraq tried to rescue hostages at #Iran border

Posted by ranjalaaldin on January 7, 2010
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The Guardian builds on its recent disclosure that Iran had a hand in the kidnapping of the British hostages. The commentary on that can be found here

British troops tried to rescue hostages at #Iran border

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/07/british-troops-iran-border-hostages

British troops in southern Iraq were scrambled to the Iranian border after the abduction of five British hostages in May 2007, in a failed attempt to stop them being taken into Iran, the Guardian has learned.

The troops were sent to the border area north of Basra to intercept the kidnappers after receiving intelligence that they were heading to the frontier from Baghdad, but failed to find them. It is unclear whether the British unit arrived too late or went to a different crossing point along the 1,500km border.

British officials today refused to give details of the attempted rescue operation, describing the issue as “extremely sensitive”, but a British journalist visiting the Iraq-Iran border a few months after the abduction was briefed on the operation by British officers who had taken part.

As the abortive rescue attempt was being launched, the five British hostages were being driven from Baghdad to the border by their kidnappers, the day after their abduction in the centre of the Iraqi capital. A year-long investigation by Guardian Films found that Iraqi intelligence trailed the abductors – who included members of the special Quds force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard – and their victims to a brickworks across the border from the Iranian town of Mehran, which the Quds force used as a base for its operations in Iraq. The hostages were seen being transferred from one set of vehicles to another at the brickworks and then driven off.

The Foreign Office has maintained that it has no evidence that the British hostages were taken across the border but the head of US central command, General David Petraeus has confirmed that the Britons – Peter Moore, Jason Swindlehurst, Jason Creswell, Alec Maclachlan and Alan McMenemy – spent some of their subsequent captivity inside Iran.

The abductions of the five men came at a time when many British officers in Basra believed they were being sucked into a proxy war with Iran. Their troops were locked in intense urban conflict with Shia militias, believed to have been trained in Iran, armed by Iran, and even supported by Iranian forces. Farsi communications were intercepted between mortar teams targeting British positions in central Basra. The kidnapping team who seized the five Britons at Iraq’s finance ministry in May 2007 were also overheard speaking what some thought was Farsi.

By the summer of 2007, intelligence officials in the US-led multinational coalition in Iraq estimated that Iranian-backed insurgents were responsible for roughly half of the attacks on their forces.

So concerned were British military commanders in Basra about the support, notably arms and roadside bomb technology, that Iran was giving Shia militia elements in the southern Iraqi city that they set up a separate battle group on the border specifically to try to stop the supplies. Furthermore, British units in the region were told to expect abduction attempts by Iranian-backed groups and rehearsed counter-measures against such a threat.

In June 2007, less than a month after the abduction of the five British hostages in Baghdad, the Ministry of Defence said an Iranian-backed plot to kidnap British troops in Basra had been foiled. A Shia Iranian-backed “special group” – elements of the Jayish al-Mahdi, Moqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi army – had planned to wear stolen British army uniforms and target a small military liaison team based at the provincial joint operations centre in Basra where British soldiers were mentoring Iraqi forces. The plot was thwarted when the liaison team was tipped off by a loyal Iraqi policeman. A military spokesman in Basra said at the time: “We have procedures to combat this particular threat and they are effective.”

Robert Baer, a former CIA agent and author of The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower, said: “Hostage-taking for the Iranians has been a tool of their foreign policy. It’s been completely ingrained into their mind that when faced with a threat, they take hostages. Hostages are a deterrent for Iran and it’s a very successful deterrent so that we see in Iraq, we’ve seen in Lebanon, we’ve seen in the American embassy takeover, hostage-taking is a tool of Iranian foreign policy which has worked these last 30 years.”

Only one of the five hostages survived their abduction in May 2007 – Peter Moore, an IT consultant from Lincoln, who was freed on 30 December. The bodies of three of his guards, Swindlehurst, Creswell and Maclachlan, were handed over to British officials in Baghdad last year. They had all been shot dead several months earlier. The fourth, Alan McMenemy, is believed to have been killed too, but his remains have yet to be returned.

Yemen: the international community’s next challenge

Posted by ranjalaaldin on January 7, 2010
Posted in: Uncategorized. Leave a Comment

This is what Daniel Korski of the European Council on Foreign Relations has to say about the ongoing problems in Yemen. The country faces a military battle on two fronts: in the north it faces the Houthi-Zaidi rebellion that’s spilled across the borders and into Saudi Arabia, which continues its military incursions along and into the Yemeni border. The south, meanwhile, has become a bastion of al-Qaida in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) where jihadist fighters across the region are able to re-group and re-equip themselves, and use the area as a launching pad for terrorist attacks within and beyond Yemen. Yemen has only recently found its way into media headlines, thanks to the failed suicide bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian terrorist who tried to blow up an airplane over Detroit on Christmas Day and who trained at a Yemeni al-Qaeda camp.

This week, the US, Britain, Spain, along with France and the Czech Republic closed their embassies because of the increased terror threat, though western embassies are opening up now and the measures were more precautionary than anything else given that the AQAP threat has been there for some time. Nevertheless, the west’s sudden shift in attention to Yemen means AQAP may also, accordingly, step up its operations.

Yemen: Europe’s next challenge

By Daniel Korski

http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_yemen_europes_next_challenge_korski/

As 2010 begins, a number of foreign policy issues are already vying for top-level attention. But one is bound to be taken much more seriously in 2010 than last year: Yemen. Unrest in the south, a rebellion in the north, a new generation of al-Qaeda operatives and a youthful, unemployed population set to double by 2025 means the country will have to move from the speechwriters’ repertoire to the policy-makers’ in-tray.

Yemen received renewed attention over the New Year’s holiday as it transpired that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian terrorist who tried to blow up an airplane over Detroit, trained at a Yemeni al-Qaeda camp. Over the weekend, the US, Britain and Spain took the unusual step of closing their embassies for fear or a terrorist attack.

Why Yemen?

The link between Yemen and al-Qaeda is close. The Bin Ladens hail from the village of al-Rubat in the Hadramaut region. The al-Qaeda chief’s fourth wife is Yemeni and he has often referred to the importance of the country, noting the Prophet Muhammad’s regard for Yemen because of its quick adoption of Islam after the faith’s establishment. But the links go further.

Yemen was second only to Saudi Arabia as a source of the anti-Soviet mujahedeen fighters. Thousands of Yemenis trained in al-Qaeda’s camps and President Saleh subsequently recruited these veterans in the war against southern Yemen. This trend continued after the civil war, with Bosnian and Chechen veterans — and, recently, Iraqi insurgents — being integrated into the Yemeni army. Today, Yemeni prisoners make up one of the largest national contingents of detainees at Guantanamo Bay.

But the al-Qaeda link is only one of a number of reasons Yemen will occupy policy-makers in 2010. A longstanding conflict in northern Yemen between the government and a rebel group, known as the Houthis after their leader’s clan, drew in Saudi Arabia last month when the rebels seized a sliver of Saudi territory, prompting Riyadh to launch a cross-border military strike. Saudi Arabia’s intervention, in turn, prompted talk of Iranian support for the rebels. What is clear is that this year’s fighting has been some of the fiercest since the conflict erupted in June 2004 when government forces sought to arrest the rebel leader, Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi.

In addition, the Yemeni government is now also facing increased unrest in the south. The Yemen Arab Republic (north) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (south) unified in 1990, to form the Republic of Yemen. But the unitary state was threatened when civil war broke out in 1994, with southern leaders calling for secession. Thousands were killed in fierce fighting which ended with the defeat of the southern leaders represented mainly by the Yemeni Socialist Party. Since then, two key issues have kept southern grievances alive – land grabs by powerful officials from the north following the civil war, and the exclusion of southern officials from top government jobs.

If that was not bad enough, Yemen faces a long-term economic crisis. Its respectable 3.9 percent average annual growth from 2000-2007 has been primarily due to an increase in oil production and prices, while revenues have yet to be invested in employment-generating, non-extractive sectors.

It will take considerable effort to help address this multifaceted challenge, not least because of the sometimes difficult relationship between the West and the Yemeni government. Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh is usually described as pro-Western, but the truth is more complex. Yemen’s political leadership has since the mid-1990s followed a delicate balancing act to maintain power, and sought to co-opt tribal factions by bringing them into government and involving them in the democratic process while expanding the president’s personal and familial control over state structures and resources.

Breaking with powerful figures, even those connected to al-Qaeda, is therefore balanced with other interests. When the U.S asked the Yemeni president to hand-over Sheikh Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, who figures on the UN’s terrorist list, he refused. Sheikh Zindani was Rector of al-Imam University, and a key opposition party figure – therefore untouchable. On other occasions it has been the US, which has balked at taking action, dictated by commercial links that exist between the U.S and Yemen; it was Hunt Oil, a Texan-based company and long-time Republican backer, which originally discovered oil in Yemen, in 1984 and remains an investor in a large Yemeni LNG project.

What should Europe do?

European governments and the EU ought still to be in a good position to help Yemen address its many problems. European support for the country has increased steadily over the years. In the last six years, the EU donated more than € 144 million with the largest share going towards economic development. European foreign ministers have also been seized of Yemen’s problems for longer than the mainstream media; in October, they expressed “deep concern” over the deteriorating situation. Finally, key EU governments have long since operated bilateral assistance programmes to support the Yemeni police and coast guards.

Yet despite this, Europe’s support to Yemen looks like the kind of pre-Lisbon offerings that EU leaders have been keen to move away from: it is mainly technocratic, developmental with the security-related programmes undertaken bilaterally by EU governments. It will be key to build on this assistance in the next six months, so that the range of the EU’s instruments — diplomatic, political, security and developmental — can be brought to bear on the crisis.

Though the EU has upgraded the chief of its delegation to a fully-fledged ambassador, it may opportune for Lady Catherine Ashton to appoint a senior EU envoy to the Gulf Region — or tap an EU foreign minister, like Germany’s Guido Westerwelle — who could consult with the different parties and draft a new programme of EU assistance.

An early task for a European envoy will be to push for greater involvement of the GCC in Yemen’s stabilisation. The Gulf states have mediated in Lebanon’s conflict and negotiated with the Taliban, but have been reluctant to engage themselves in Yemen. Yet their involvement will be important to help bring the various Yemeni parties – the Government, the Opposition, the Southern secessionists and the Huthi rebels – into some kind peace-like process. Results may not be obtained for years, but it will nonetheless pay for the EU to show early engagement and to consult the local and regional parties at a senior level.

Though there is likely to be limited appetite for an official CSDP mission, an innovative programme of assistance that includes out-of-country training for Yemeni officials, as conducted by EUJUST LEX in Iraq, and the co-location of trainers in key ministries, such as undertaken by the EU in Bosnia-Herzegovina, would complement the mooted US increase in counter-terrorism assistance.

Such an assistance programme could be unveiled at summit of the European leaders and Gulf state Heads of Governments, with support for Yemen at the top of the agenda. Depending on the willingness of the other Gulf states to engage (and Yemen’s acceptance of their engagement) it may even be possible to explore a joint EU-GCC project based in Sana’a, for example on border, or maritime security.

Yemen’s multiple conflicts may not yet be “ripe” for resolution, as many of the local and regional actors seem reluctant to accept that force is unlikely to work in their favour. Even when they are ready to talk, for example about holding elections or decentralisation from the Sanaa government to the north and south, it will be because regional players exert influence on and in Yemen. But the potential for collapse and the considerable presence of al-Qaeda means the EU cannot waste time. Based on its on-going development assistance, the EU, led by High Representative Catherine Ashton, and an EU envoy, should engage local and regional leaders, and develop a multi-pronged programme of assistance.

Always something between Erbil and Baghdad

Posted by ranjalaaldin on January 6, 2010
Posted in: Uncategorized. Tagged: Iraq, Iraq oil, Kurdistan. Leave a Comment

Kurdistan Alliance officials have said certain clauses in the draft 2010 budget law constitute an attempt to pressure the Kurdistan Regional Government because of oil contracts signed with global companies. Abd-al-Muhsin al-Sa’dun, member of the Kurdistan Alliance Bloc, has said that some clauses refer to imposing sanctions on governorates and regions where oil pumping stops for certain reasons. Back in October Kurdistan stopped oil exports because of continuing disputes with Baghdad. Though oil from the north may have to be exported through Iraqi government pipelines running to Turkey, giving Baghdad a stranglehold on the transport of oil produced there, Iraq needs all the revenue it can get to finance its reconstruction, civil service, and the provision of basic services.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/13/world/middleeast/13iraqoil.html

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  • About

    Ranj Alaaldin is a Middle East and North Africa political and security risk analyst. He is a Senior Analyst at the Next Century Foundation and is doing a doctorate on the Shias of Iraq at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He visits the Middle East and North Africa region regularly, including recent stints in Iraq and Libya and has written extensively on MENA affairs for the Guardian, Telegraph, Wall Street Journal, Foreign Policy magazine, Christian Science Monitor and numerous other print and online publications. On Libya, as an early advocate of armed intervention to oust the former Libyan regime, in March 2011 he was part of a fact-finding mission that visited Libya almost immediately after the international intervention to assess the on-the-ground situation in Benghazi and Misrata and report back to UK and US policy makers, as well as western NGOs and journalists.
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  • Ranj Alaaldin recent articles/posts

    • The Kurds’ Opportunity – Wall Street Journal
    • Iraq must divide to survive – The Guardian
    • Libya’s Tough Road Ahead – Wall Street Journal
    • The Kurdish Strategy for Iraq: divide and exploit – The Guardian
    • The Face of Victory in Tripoli – The Wall Street Journal
    • Libya’s Unraveling Opposition – The Wall Street Journal
    • Intensify Attacks in Libya – HuffingtonPost
    • Libya is not ready for a political solution – The Guardian
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