No-fly zone in Libya

Posted by ranjalaaldin on February 23, 2011
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How to stop a Libyan massacre: the power is in our hands | openDemocracy | Ranj Alaaldin

http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ranj-alaaldin/how-to-stop-libyan-massacre-power-is-in-our-hands

Ranj Alaaldin issues a timely call for a considered form of
intervention in Libya’s uprising. With the Libyan air force already
firing on its own people, and escalation likely, a no-fly zone must be
implemented over Libyan airspace to prevent mass casualties.

Colonel Gaddafi’s regime is on the brink and nearing collapse. At the
same time, however, the people of Libya are also edging closer towards
slaughter at the hands of a regime that has proven and explicitly
stated that it will be brutal and unwavering in its efforts to
suppress the uprising in the country.

The time has come for the international community to stop looking at
events in Libya through the prisms of Tunisia and Egypt and come to
terms with the reality that the Gaddafi regime is a different animal
altogether.

The people of Libya can only do so much. They have the power of the
masses and may become too difficult a challenge to contain by the
Libyan security forces and their hired foreign henchmen. Members of
the security forces, along with senior diplomats and major tribes,
have already defected. In other words, through the power of numbers,
the Libyan population may be able to overcome Gaddafi and his inner
circle who have a superiority in arms.

But what the regime still has and what the people of Libya are unable
to match is the all-significant and decisive impact weapon that is
airpower. The ability that is to effortlessly and unrelentlessly put
down a population and the passion and resolve it has so admirably
exercised.

This is where the international community, and particularly the west,
can come in to feasibly support the Libyan people. With or without a
Security Council resolution, the west must not simply condemn the
repression of the Libyan civilian population and push for allowing
access for international humanitarian organisations, but also impose a
no-fly zone in the country.

No-fly zones are an important tool of conflict management that provide
an effective way to support the besieged Libyan population in what is
a dangerous conflict area, and with relatively little risk. The policy
works. Go ask the Kurds in Iraq. Following the end of the first Gulf
War, a no-fly zone in the north of Iraq was declared in March 1991 to
protect Iraqi Kurds after Saddam Hussein’s regime had put down their
uprising. That policy ensured Saddam was never again able to inflict
upon the Kurds the massacres he had continuously subjected them to in
previous years, the most macabre being the 1988 chemical bombardment
of Halabja that killed 5,000 Kurds almost instantly.

This constitutes a middle-ground intervention on the part of the
international community that avoids direct-armed conflict with Libya
and instead falls between full-scale military intervention and a
temporary bombing campaign. Direct military action may have unintended
consequences and compound the situation by forcing the regime to adopt
a scorched-earth policy, whilst simultaneously supporting the regime’s
claims to its people that “foreign agents” are at play in the unrest.
A move of this type will only help the regime’s propaganda and may
lead to the failure of the revolution.

Few people will support the claim that Gaddafi is a lesser evil than
Saddam. A no-fly zone will ensure Libyan helicopter gunships are not
used to dreadful effect against indiscriminate targets like they were
during the 1991 uprising in Iraq. It will deprive the regime of the
ability to enforce extraordinarily brutal countermeasures from the
air, like the bombardment of heavily populated residential areas and
the destroying of homes.

As the regime becomes more and more desperate, so too will its
response become more brutal. Can the international community depend
and pin their hopes on further defections and pilots refusing to carry
out such orders, like the two that yesterday sought asylum in Malta?
Maybe. But the prudent person would argue that is a risk too grave to
take and one that effectively gambles with the lives of thousands. The
city of Benghazi, reportedly under the control of the regime’s
opponents, has a population of 600,000. It will be the first to be hit
and the international community will be unable to do anything but
disgracefully watch.

Failure to prevent genocides and massacres around the world has put
the international community on the wrong side of history. Yet, this is
a chance to prevent another mass atrocity from taking place, a chance
for us to take a responsible measure rather than a reactionary one
that comes too late. The international community has the capacity to
limit Gaddafi’s capacity for mass murder by keeping his bombers
grounded.

The measure itself will be difficult to contest. Protestors have been
fired on from planes and helicopters already. Al-Jazeera has reported
of military aircraft firing live ammunition yesterday at crowds of
anti-government protesters in the capital Tripoli. Yesterday’s
defection by two Libyan pilots proves that the order to slaughter the
people has already been given. One can only hope that an internal
dispute within the Libyan government prevented a further two from
being deployed for the same purpose. The Libyans may not be so lucky
again.

A Gaddafi the west can no longer deal with – The Guardian

Posted by ranjalaaldin on February 22, 2011
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See Guardian article below on a different Saif al-Islam Gaddafi

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/21/saif-al-islam-gaddafi

Saif al-Islam Gaddafi: LSE-educated man the west can no longer deal with | World news | The Guardian

Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, son of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. Photograph: Sergei Karpukhin/Reuters
With his flawless English, his expensive Italian suits and his place at the London School of Economics, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi appeared to be a man with whom the west could do business: a man who could smooth access to his country’s vast mineral resources while avoiding the need to deal with his famously capricious father.

As state security forces were reported to be firing relentlessly into crowds of civilian protesters on Monday, and with Gaddafi Jr appearing on television to threaten a civil war in which the regime “will fight to the last minute, until the last bullet”, many of his erstwhile associates were questioning their friendships with him.

The LSE has been quick to distance itself from Saif, issuing a statement in which it said the university had had a number of links with Libya, but that “in view of the highly distressing news from Libya over the weekend of 19-20 February, the school has reconsidered those links as a matter of urgency”.

Although the LSE had accepted £1.5m from the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation, an organisation headed by Saif – some of which was to finance “a virtual democracy centre” – the university stressed that it was to be paid over five years, and only £300,000 has been received to date. “In current difficult circumstances across the region, the school has decided to stop new activities under that programme,” the statement said. The LSE has also received scholarship funding in return for advice given to the Libyan Investment Authority in London. “No further receipts are anticipated,” the university said.

Professor David Held, an academic advisor to Saif Gaddafi during his four years at the LSE, said: “Watching Saif give that speech – looking so exhausted, nervous and, frankly, terrible – was the stuff of Shakespeare and of Freud: a young man torn by a struggle between loyalty to his father and his family, and the beliefs he had come to hold for reform, democracy and the rule of law. The man giving that speech wasn’t the Saif I had got to know well over those years.”

The university’s move to break its financial links to the regime in Tripoli did nothing to silence criticism, however. Raheem Kassam, director of the anti-radicalisation group Student Rights, said: “LSE has the most market-driven fund-raising model there is in the UK. Has that model reduced them into a simple gun for hire?”

An explanation for Gaddafi’s arrival at the LSE in 2002 may be found in one of the WikiLeaks cables, in which a US diplomat notes that “creating the appearance of useful employment for al-Qadhafi’s offspring has been an important objective for the regime”.

Shortly before he arrived, apparently with the blessing of the late Fred Halliday, professor of international relations, he startled some of the academic staff by insisting that it was his father, and not Anthony Giddens, emeritus professor at the university, who created the concept of the third way, then a pet philosophy of Tony Blair.

In the introduction to his doctoral dissertation on global governance, published in 2008, Gaddafi wrote: “I shall be primarily concerned with what I argue is the central failing of the current system of global governance in the new global environment: that it is highly undemocratic.”

The purpose of his dissertation, he added, was to analyse “how to create more just and democratic global governing institutions”, focusing on the importance of the role of “civil society”.

Six months after arriving in the UK, and with US-led forces about to invade Iraq, he is said to have approached MI6 to inform the agency that his father’s regime was prepared to abandon its nuclear weapons programme. The contact led to negotiations between Libya, Britain and the US which saw the programme dismantled, and the Gaddafi regime begin to be allowed in from the cold.

While studying for his PhD, Saif enjoyed a life of considerable luxury in one of London’s wealthiest and most prestigious suburbs. In August 2009 Gaddafi bought his son a £10m house in north London. Inside the neo-Georgian eight-bedroom mansion, Saif could relax in his own swimming pool sauna room, whirlpool bath and suede-lined cinema room.

Now the entourage of blacked-out cars parked on Saif’s driveway has disappeared and there is less need for the forest of CCTV cameras or the private security team who had been on hand to protect him at all times.

During his time in London Gaddafi mixed socially with Lord Mandelson and the financier Nathaniel Rothschild, and was said to be on friendly terms with the Duke of York. He played a leading role in talks that led to the 2009 release of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, the man convicted of the 1988 Lockerbie bombing in which 270 people died. While flying Megrahi home to Libya on a private jet, Gaddafi Jr gave a television interview in which he said the release had been linked to lucrative business deals.

Mandelson later insisted any suggestion that the British government had struck a deal and then instructed the Scottish government to release Megrahi was wrong, implausible “and actually quite offensive”.

A review of documentation relating to the release conducted by the cabinet secretary, Sir Gus O’Donnell, reported earlier this month that the British government had been anxious to avoiding harming the country’s commercial interests, and that there would be “severe ramifications for UK interests” if Megrahi was to die in prison.

Cleric’s return signals uncertainty for Iraq

Posted by ranjalaaldin on January 8, 2011
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Cleric’s return signals uncertainty for Iraq (OpenDemocracy)

The anti-US Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, commander of the Mahdi Army militia responsible for the killing and wounding of thousands of US personnel, yesterday returned to Iraq having spent at least three-years of self-imposed exile in Iran, where he has pursued religious studies.

His return, not necessarily the first since he left in 2007 but certainly the first to be made public, is arguably telling of the changing dynamics of the Iraqi political arena and indeed of the Sadrist movement itself.

The Sadrists won nearly 40 seats in last year’s parliamentary elections. With seven ministries to his bloc’s name and the deputy-speaker of parliament post, as well as a collection of governorships in the south of the country, al-Sadr’s return may have also been part of this package of concessions offered to him by arch-enemy Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, in return for his backing of Maliki as premier. This is since the cleric still has an outstanding arrest warrant against him for the murder of Sayyid Abdul-Majid Khoei in 2003, one of Iraq’s leading Shia clerics backed by both the US and UK.

That warrant may soon be revoked and al-Sadr’s return, if permanent, is likely to be part of a long-term strategy to embolden his bloc and its orbit of influence in the country.

His return will consolidate his movement’s political gains and will better galvanise his supporters, numbering millions of impoverished Shias and derived predominantly from Sadr City, the north Baghdad slum. This becomes particularly crucial for the movement as a result of internal divisions it has suffered in recent years. The most notable group to splinter from the movement is the so-called League of the Righteousness, led by Qais al-Khazali, the militiaman complicit in the 2007 kidnapping of Britain’s Peter Moore. The League of the Righteousness was recently involved in a gun battle with the Sadrists.

Al-Sadr’s return could also be part of a broader, longer-term plan to place himself as the successor to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, Iraq’s leading Shia cleric and the spiritual leader of Shia Muslims around the world. Al-Sadr, who himself comes from a famous clerical family has for long competed with Sistani for power and influence.

However, that will depend on the state of al-Sadr’s religious credentials. It takes decades to reach the rank of Grand Ayatollah. More importantly will be relations between al-Sadr and other leading figures of the clergy in the holy city of Najaf. Al-Sadr faces competition from Ayatollah Mohammad Saeed al-Hakim to become Sistani’s successor. Al-Hakim is widely tipped to be the successor; but what could make the competition for clerical authority violently uncertain is the fact that al-Hakim is more hostile to al-Sadr than Sistani is and, significantly, has not hesitated to outspokenly and publicly criticise him.

For now, it will be a case of waiting and seeing. It is not yet certain al-Sadr will stay in Iraq. He may return to Iran and continue his religious studies, lest suggestions that he left Iraq because he feared for his life or because of the arrest warrant issued against him is given credence.

It also remains to be seen whether Iraq is big enough a place for both al-Sadr and al-Maliki, who went head-to-head in the 2008 Battle for Basra that ultimately led to defeat and a dramatic decline in power for the former. Al-Sadr’s return had to have been approved by Iran and it came on the same day Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Salehi visited Baghdad. Iran may have sanctioned al-Sadr’s return to put a check on Maliki, who has in the past moved against Iranian interests in Iraq.

There is further uncertainty about what implications al-Sadr’s arrival may have for the US, as it prepares to withdraw completely by the end of this year. The US will be ill at ease with the arrival of what it regards as an Iranian proxy so close to its departure. During his visit yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister repeated Iran’s demand that Maliki’s government not extend the US troop presence. Al-Sadr may have returned to ensure just that and possibly through any means necessary.

Muqtada al-Sadr returns to #Iraq

Posted by ranjalaaldin on January 5, 2011
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Muqtada al-Sadr is back in Iraq, returning this morning after spending at least four-years of self-imposed exile in Iran, where he has ostensibly been pursuing religious studies. It isn’t yet clear whether he’s back for good or if this is just a fleeting visit to Najaf. Chances are that he’ll return to Iran to continue his religious studies, lest his credibility takes a hit – why else, his supporters and opponents may ask, has he spent so many years in Iran if it wasn’t for his theological studies? His representatives have rejected suggestions that he left Iraq because he feared for his life or because of an arrest warrant that was issued against him for the murder of Sayyid Abdul-Majid Khoei in 2003, one of Iraq’s leading Shi’a clerics. For him to stay without having attained any religious credentials would strengthen and give credence to these arguments, as well as point toward a grand deal that may have been struck between him and his rival and arch-enemy, Prime Minister Maliki and the Islamic Da’wa Party.

It is also significant that this trip was made public, given that he has secretly returned on previous occasions. Change may indeed be on the horizon.

————

Anti-U.S. Shi’ite cleric visits Iraq after years

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE7042D820110105

By Khaled Farhan, REUTERS

NAJAF, Iraq | Wed Jan 5, 2011 9:09am EST

NAJAF, Iraq (Reuters) – Anti-U.S. Shi’ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr returned to Iraq on Wednesday from years of self-imposed exile in Iran, after his movement struck a deal to be part of a new government, Sadrist officials said.

Mazan al-Sadi, a Sadrist cleric in Baghdad, said Sadr, whose movement battled U.S. forces after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, was visiting the Shi’ite holy city of Najaf in southern Iraq.

“I am on my way to Najaf. The first thing that Moqtada did was to visit the Imam Ali Shrine, the grave of his father, and then he went to his family house in Hanana,” Sadi said.

Ahmed al-Khalidi, the media official at Sadr’s office in Najaf, confirmed the cleric was in the city.

Sadr, the scion of a Shi’ite religious family, galvanized anti-U.S. sentiment following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and led two uprisings against U.S. forces in 2004.

He fled Iraq sometime between 2006-7 after an arrest warrant was issued for him.

The cleric’s Mehdi Army, once a feared militia, has largely laid down its arms but U.S. military officials and many Sunni Arabs still regard it with suspicion.

The Mehdi Army was blamed for many of the sectarian killings that ravaged Iraq after the invasion.

Sadr’s political movement secured a deal to be part of Iraq’s new government after supporting incumbent Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki for a second term in office.

It has 39 seats in the new parliament and will get seven ministries.

New Iraq government will struggle

Posted by ranjalaaldin on December 29, 2010
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The Iraqi government’s patchwork alliance may struggle to survive

On Tuesday, Iraq just about managed to form a government – only days before a constitutional deadline, and nine months since the elections took place. With the cabinet now named and accepted by parliament, the hard work starts for a country that still has many challenges and disputes to overcome.

High on the agenda for the Iraqi government and the prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, (who will run the ministries of interior and defence himself until accepted candidates are found) will be to consolidate the security gains of the past three years. In tandem with this will be the usual efforts to improve basic services and infrastructure. Yet, all this depends on the ability of this new government to actually function.

Whether it can function is by no means certain. The government is composed of unlikely political and ideological bedfellows and is the product of desperate power-seeking efforts among easily compromised domestic elements.

The difference this time is the all-inclusiveness of the government. Iraq’s Sunni Arabs are now better represented, with the Sunni-dominated Iraqi National movement (INM) of Ayad Allawi taking the parliamentary speaker’s post, the deputy premiership and the all-important finance ministry, among others.

The Kurds and the major Shia-dominated groups, including Maliki’s State of Law coalition and the Sadrists, took a collection of sovereign and service ministries. While this means Iraq has a truly national government, what it will achieve in terms of policy and direction is not so great, given that it has been formed on the basis of promises and compromises that may be reneged on or delayed at the very least.

Lasting peace and stability depends on resolving outstanding disputes with the Kurds on oil, revenue-sharing, security and the disputed territories (Kirkuk in particular). The Kurds, rather than exploiting their kingmaker position to take a stronger proportion of ministries in Baghdad (they are taking just one major portfolio – the foreign ministry), are instead banking on guarantees from Maliki to implement their list of 19 demands that includes resolving the above disputes in their favour.

They may have been naive, though. With their historical and federalist partners, the Islamic supreme council of Iraq in decline, the Kurds may be isolated in the new government – a government dominated by the nationalistic and centrist characteristics of the INM, the Sadrists and indeed State of Law.

Maliki may, therefore, turn out to be unable to grant concessions even if he wanted to and could use Osama Nujayfi, the new ultra-nationalist speaker of parliament and Kurdish foe, to absorb the Kurdish criticism and insulate himself from any attacks.

Then comes the role of Iraq’s empowered Sunni representatives, the INM. Their complaints have centred on under-representation and what they called the dominance of the Iranian-backed Shia. Whether they intend to play a positive or obstructive role in government will depend on the extent to which their own agenda has changed.

It is a question of whether they still harbour suspicions towards Maliki and contest his legitimacy (in which case they will seek to utilise their newfound power to undermine him and the country) or, alternatively, whether they are now seriously committed to bridging the sectarian divide and steering Iraq away from instability.

Similarly, Iraq’s ruling Shia groups must also prove that they are committed to the process of reconciliation and peaceful politics.

Eyes will be particularly fixed on the Sadrist bloc, which won nearly 40 seats in the elections, to see if they have given up on violent politics. The Sadrists walked out on Maliki’s first government in 2007 and only joined his current one at the behest of Iran. For now, their control of the service ministries (housing, public works, labour and planning) will be utilised to strengthen their grassroots base.

As it stands, the new government has been determined on the basis of appeasement rather than accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, bearing in mind that this was the country’s first chance to have a serious opposition, in the form of the INM, that could hold the government to account.

At worst, the power-sharing arrangement will lead to fragmentation or, at best, stagnation. The internal strife has already started, with the Kurds rejecting official and media reports that suggest Hussain al-Shahristani, the former oil minister who has been at loggerheads with the Kurds over energy contracts, will retain his influence over the energy sector in his capacity as deputy premier.

What will also be a point of contention are the powers of the new National Council of Strategic Policies, headed by Allawi subject to it being granted its powers by parliament. Granting the council powers that restrict those of the prime minister will satisfy and placate Allawi. Restricting it to a mere advisory role may provoke a rebellion, albeit a weak one given that the INM is divided and Allawi’s powerful colleagues like Salah al-Mutlaq (deputy prime minister) and Nujayfi are now unlikely to follow suit.

Afghanistan: time to face reality

Posted by ranjalaaldin on December 23, 2010
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See the article below on the realities in Afghanistan, published by OpenDemocracy.

http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ranj-alaaldin/afghanistan-time-to-face-reality

Afghanistan: time to face reality

Ranj Alaaldin argues that only the drastic curtailment of Nato ambitions in Afghanistan, and some unpalatable choices, will secure any semblance of stability in the country.

Afghanistan continues to edge towards the precipice. State-building efforts in the country are still plagued with inefficiency, corruption and disorganisation, whilst international coalition forces in the form of Nato’s International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) find themselves at the losing end of a battle to dominate the public perception on the Afghan street: ongoing daily violence, coupled with increasing calls for a firm withdrawal among the international community has signalled to average Afghans that the West will soon pack up and go, whilst the resilient, unwavering Taliban are there to stay.

All is not yet lost though. Nato nations will have to soon start taking tough decisions and bring their war aims back to basics if they are going to achieve the underlying objective that took them to the country in the first place.

The US and its international partners’ objectives in Afghanistan have generally fallen under three over-arching categories: stability, representative governance and the rule of law. The ‘stability’ objective in specific terms means ensuring Afghanistan does not once again become a place from which extremist forces can attack the West and its interests. The narrative, as diplomats, analysts and academics alike currently tell it is that this can only be achieved once the other objectives are met. In other words, Afghanistan cannot be secured until you have an efficient and legitimate government that can implement some respectful standard of democracy and human rights.

It is now clear that this strategy is utterly flawed and unrealistic. Nine years on, the Obama administration’s year-end review of its Afghanistan war strategy, released this month, tried its best to provide as rosy a picture possible, emphasising that the strategy in Afghanistan is working but that it is nevertheless fragile and reversible. What the nine-year conflict has in fact shown is that the numerous over-arching objectives cannot be met in their entirety, will certainly not be achieved should the US begin its drawdown in July 2011 or within the five year troop withdrawal deadline being proposed by British Prime Minister David Cameron, and will most certainly not be achieved within the next ten years – if the current record is anything to go by.

Firstly, there is no political strategy in Afghanistan that can reconcile the Karzai-led government with other rival tribal and political factions, all vying for power and a serious stake in the country. The current government is entrenched in a tribal and political web of patronage and corruption that has become impossible to remedy.

Beyond this, and secondly, there is no clear consensus on how, and whether, to negotiate and reconcile with the fragmented Taliban. The Taliban is not the cohesive, hierarchical and organised entity that it may come across as being. Widely accepted is that there are at least three disparate entities fighting in the country: the Taliban, which is led by Mullah Omar, whose whereabouts remains elusive; the Haqqani network, led by the former mujahideen warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj Haqqani and, finally, a collection of domestic and foreign fighters that includes al-Qaida. There is, therefore, no one leader to negotiate with.

A group of fieldworkers, in an open letter to President Obama, did recently call for a political settlement that includes the Taliban. That proposition centres around engaging with the so-called Quetta Shura, a council of Afghan insurgency leaders based in Pakistan. Yet, even if the Taliban and any representative leaders were to sit at the roundtable, it has to first be asked whether or to what extent they will accommodate any of the conditions imperative for lasting peace and stability, which includes giving up their arms and recognising the Afghan constitution. How the Taliban could do so without losing face and credibility among the local populace must be determined, given that it is they who have the momentum and benefit of time, not us.

Finally, even if a grand strategy was offered, elements within and beyond Afghanistan in neighbouring states have become convinced that Nato will not be around long enough to enforce it or assist with its implementation. The now clear commitment to withdraw troops within a fixed deadline or, at the very least, reduce troops in the country justifies their concerns.

What this means is that Kabul will have little incentive to engage with the insurgency and carry out the reforms essential for any counter-insurgency initiative to work.  The Afghan government, suffering from a legitimacy crisis, is not committed to maintaining stability. It is aware of the above limitations in the state-building process and thus individuals within its upper echelons will continue to maximise their political and financial gain while they are in a position to do so, convinced that an Isaf withdrawal and potential defeat lies on the horizon.

Nato powers, unwilling to publicly repudiate the government and its shambolic elections, or advocate an alternative, have inadvertently consolidated their positions and are now unable to displace them and their obstructive networks of power peacefully, so that reform takes place. To remove them from power now would invite a violent backlash of epic and uncontrollable proportions.

The international community must accept that an efficient and representative government is no longer feasible, and certainly not one able to adequately implement the rule of law and enforce human rights. These are values that may have to be sacrificed. Sadly, Afghans never had such luxuries in the first place, at least not in recent times, and, although a Chatham House report released this month advocates the promotion of justice in the fight for peace and stability, in truth the West is unlikely to ever be in a position to provide them with it.

To carry on in denial and futility will be a waste of human lives, resources and in essence unfair on the Afghan people. Instead, the West must go back to what it does best: make do with what it has and pursue its historic policy of supporting suspect regimes in the middle east, Asia and Latin America.

Karzai and his government may have to be heavily propped up; financially and militarily supported and assured, so that it becomes the West’s bulwark against the insurgency and extremists – the ultimate objective. The West would therefore leave Afghanistan to (some) Afghans but without handing the state back to the Taliban and al-Qaida.

To make this effective and rewarding, focus must continue to be on the Afghan security forces, ensuring they are up to the task of countering the insurgency. Defeating them may not be an option, containing and reducing them to sporadic attacks is though.

That requires maintaining, beyond any withdrawal, an international force of military and police advisors, engaged in non-combat duties and comprised of the renowned EU police training missions. At present there are some 3,600 trainers on the ground. There is still a shortfall of nearly 500 trainers, but once the focus turns from combat to training that can be rectified by states who may have previously been reluctant.

More challenging is keeping at bay Afghanistan’s neighbours. The proxy conflict between the Pakistani intelligence service (the ISI) and the Indian intelligence service (RAW) suggests that Pakistan will not cooperate with Nato in Afghanistan, despite pretences to the contrary. In reality, Pakistan seeks instability in Afghanistan since a stable Afghanistan will likely be pro-India. India has a vested interest in the current government, possibly more so than the West, because it is a means of containing Pakistan.

China feels that Nato’s presence in Afghanistan is an effort at securing a strategic base in the region whilst securing access to energy resources and encircling China. Iran, meanwhile, will be ill at ease with a stable Nato ally on its Eastern border. Keeping Nato resources tied up in Afghanistan means the probability of war against Iran is reduced.

All this renders it even more imperative to ensure the current government is consolidated, lest the withdrawal of Isaf leads to a civil war intensified by regional neighbours and which leads to the collapse of the Karzai government, much like the 1992 collapse of the Najabullah government three years after the Soviet withdrawal.

Pursuant to this, it is also an option to maintain the above-mentioned international force of advisors for at least another twenty-years. There is no reason why these non-combat personnel cannot be deployed alongside Afghan forces in the most extreme and unlikely of cases, upon the request of the Afghan government and in the event the government does edge towards the brink.

In short, any strategy in Afghanistan must revolve around what is viable and sustainable. Propping up Karzai is not the ideal choice to take but it is perhaps the only realistic option amidst what is a complex political, security and geopolitical environment.

#Iraq names cabinet – finally

Posted by ranjalaaldin on December 21, 2010
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Iraq has finally named a cabinet to lead the country after a nine-month power struggle, a peaceful and civilised struggle it has to be said though. Key security portfolios were not among those announced by Prime Minister Maliki, who will run the defence, interior and national security ministries himself as acting-minister until rival groups choose suitable candidates over the next four days.

The cabinet, so far, includes:

Nouri al-Maliki: Prime Minister and acting Minister of Defence, Interior and National Security
Hussein al-Shahristani: Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Electricity
Saleh al-Mutlaq: Deputy Prime Minister
Roj Nouri Shawis: Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Trade
Hoshyar Zebari: Foreign Ministry and acting Minister of State for Women Affairs
Iyad Allawi: Head of National Council for Strategic Policies:
Rafi Issawi: Treasury Ministry
Abdul Karim Luaibi: Oil minister
Ali Adib: Higher Education Ministry and Acting Minister of National Reconciliation
Hadi al-Amri: Transport Ministry
Mohammed Al-Daraji: Minister of Housing and Acting Minister of Public Works
Muhammad Tamim: Education Ministry
Ahmad Nasir Dilli: Industry Ministry
Izz al-Din al-Dawlah: Agriculture Ministry
Jasim Muhammad Ja’far: Youth and Sports Ministry
Hasan al-Shammari: Justice Ministry
Torhan Muzhar Hassan: Minister of State for Provincial Affairs
Muhammad Allawi: Communication Ministry
Abd-al-Karim al-Samarra’i: Science and Technology Ministry
Sa’dun al-Dulaymi: Culture Ministry
Sarkon Lazar: Minister of Environment
Liwa’a Simsim: Minister of Tourism and Heritage
Muhanned Al-Sa’adi: Minister of Water Resources
Dindar Najman Shafeeq: Immigration and Displaced Persons Ministry Persons and Acting Minister of State for Civil Society
Majid Hamid Amin: Health Ministry
Mohammed Al-Sudani: Human Right Ministry
Nassar Al-Rubai: Minister of Labour and Social Affairs and Acting Minister of Planning
Ali al-Sajiri: Ministry of State for Foreign Affairs
Safa al-Din al-Safi: State Ministry for Council of Representatives
Ali al-Dabbagh: State Ministry for Government Spokesmanship Affairs
Bushra Hussain Saleh: Minister of State
Hassan Al-Sari: Minister of State
Abdul-Mehdi Hassan Al-Mutairi: Minister of State
Ali Al-Sajri: Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Safaa Aldeen Al-Safi: Minister of State for Council of Representatives
Salah Muzahim Darwish: Minister of State
Yassin Hassan Mohammed: Minister of State

Maliki set to become Prime Minister of Iraq

Posted by ranjalaaldin on September 25, 2010
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According to sources, the Maliki premiership is now a certainty and should be confirmed within the week or next at the latest. The reality is that it was always going to be a Maliki premiership, America wants continuity, it has dealt with Maliki, enjoys dealing with Maliki and wants this to continue. Nor will Iran be complaining for the obvious and usual reasons. There was never any alternative from the outset. Allawi may have won the elections, but he was never going to get the backing from across the ethnic and sectarian spectrum. The inclusion of numerous, widely detested ultra-nationalists in his coalition didn’t exactly help. What we have seen over the past 6 months (the so-called alliance between SOL and INA, the Sadrist referendum, the umpteen visits by the various parties to different parts of the country and so on) has been a “will he, won’t he” facade, a game of bluffs and strategic manoeuvring.

Having said this, whilst Maliki will become prime minister, what isn’t clear is the exact role Allawi will play. There are plans to make him head of a national security council which Allawi wants to control the army. However, Allawi doesn’t want this to be some political initiative that can be swiftly repealed at a later date, he wants it incorporated into the Iraqi constitution or turned into a legitimate/constitutional entity. Yet, this would effectively render Maliki a token prime minister – and he knows it. What will be interesting, therefore, is how this aspect of the ongoing process will materialise and I wouldn’t be surprised if Allawi is dropped altogether and other elements (Hashimi, Issawi) are brought in to appease Iraq’s Sunni constituency. The uninteresting part is, of course, the issue of the next premier since it’s been known for some time – at least privately – that Maliki will stay in office.

Also important to note is that Allawi’s colleagues in the INA would rather see Allawi NOT get the premiership or any major role, for this would deprive them of the numerous ministries they would be entitled to – and that’s what they really want.

Oil from #Iraq #Kurdistan smuggled into Tehran

Posted by ranjalaaldin on July 9, 2010
Posted in: Uncategorized. 1 comment

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/world/middleeast/09kurds.html?_r=1

Key excerpts:

“Even as the United States imposes new sanctions on Iran, one of the biggest gaps in the American strategy is on full display here in Iraq, where hundreds of millions of dollars in crude oil and refined products are smuggled over the scenic mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan every year.”

“Smuggling of oil and other goods and commodities along Iraq’s porous borders thrived in the 1990s, when Iraq was under international sanctions. But the semiofficial nature of the current trade
underscored how business interests had trumped the messy politics of Iraq and the region.”

“The stream of tankers into Iran continued without interruption during an Iranian military campaign last month against Iranian Kurdish separatists operating at the border. Hundreds of tankers, each with a capacity of at least 226 barrels of crude oil and refined products, enter Iran every day from Penjwin and two other border posts in Iraqi Kurdistan, Kurdish officials say.”

“The trade is supported by an estimated 70 mini-refineries, known in the industry as topping plants, said the Kurdistan region’s oil minister, Ashti Hawrami. They are dotted around the Kurdistan region and Kurdish-controlled areas in nearby Kirkuk and Nineveh Province, he said, and many of them are unlicensed”

In a rare interview in May, Mr. Hawrami said only fuel oil and byproducts like naphtha were being sent to Iran after processing the region’s own crude at two privately owned refineries to meet the internal market’s needs and run a local power plant. He said any extra revenue that accrued to the region from this business was being kept out of the Kurdistan government’s finances and deposited in a separate bank account to be reconciled with Baghdad in the future, once the two sides resolved their differences.”

“Analysts say that the Kurdish region’s oil trade with Iran provides a revenue source that it does not have to share with Baghdad, at least for now, diminishing its reliance on exports to Turkey. It also grants them leverage in resolving oil and internal border disputes with Baghdad.”

“Mr. Malla-Nuri wants revenue from the Iran trade to flow into the region’s budget after deducting what is owed to the rest of Iraq — 83 percent, according to current arrangements.The region’s prime minister, Barham Salih, is also reportedly pushing for this but is being met with fierce resistance, even from his own party, which is headed by Iraq’s president, Jalal Talabani.”

“Mr. Salih’s task is further complicated by an acrimonious
relationship with the regional oil minister, Mr. Hawrami, who is backed by the region’s president, Massoud Barzani.”

“Mr. Talabani’s party has had a so-called strategic agreement with Mr. Barzani’s party since 2005, allowing them to divide the region’s political, economic and military power. This applied to the oil trade with Iran as well, according to a top Kurdish official who requested anonymity because he belonged to one of the governing parties.”

Another compromise candidate for Iraq?

Posted by ranjalaaldin on April 6, 2010
Posted in: Uncategorized. Tagged: , . 4 comments

As Iraq’s blocs continue to push for, make and break alliances it is becoming increasingly likely that the country may have yet another compromise candidate. Current PM Nouri al-Maliki was himself a compromise candidate, coming into the job from obscurity but going on to make a name for himself and become the most important figure in his party, the Islamic Dawa Party.

Having provoked the ire of his rivals outside of Dawa over the years, there are, however, some who will be vehemently against another Maliki term. One alternative candidate, within Dawa itself, is  Sherwan (a Kurdish name) al-Wa’ili, the present minister of state for national security affairs. According to reports, he is also preferred by Dawa’s “Iranian wing” (or a specific part of Dawa comprised of individuals closer to Tehran than other members of the party).

Sherwan alWa’ili is part of Dawa’s other faction (the Islamic Dawa Party – Iraq organisation), which splintered from IDP during Saddam’s rule. The splinter group is part of the same State of Law coalition that contested the elections.