Yemen: the international community’s next challenge

This is what Daniel Korski of the European Council on Foreign Relations has to say about the ongoing problems in Yemen. The country faces a military battle on two fronts: in the north it faces the Houthi-Zaidi rebellion that’s spilled across the borders and into Saudi Arabia, which continues its military incursions along and into the Yemeni border. The south, meanwhile, has become a bastion of al-Qaida in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) where jihadist fighters across the region are able to re-group and re-equip themselves, and use the area as a launching pad for terrorist attacks within and beyond Yemen. Yemen has only recently found its way into media headlines, thanks to the failed suicide bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian terrorist who tried to blow up an airplane over Detroit on Christmas Day and who trained at a Yemeni al-Qaeda camp.

This week, the US, Britain, Spain, along with France and the Czech Republic closed their embassies because of the increased terror threat, though western embassies are opening up now and the measures were more precautionary than anything else given that the AQAP threat has been there for some time. Nevertheless, the west’s sudden shift in attention to Yemen means AQAP may also, accordingly, step up its operations.

Yemen: Europe’s next challenge

By Daniel Korski

http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_yemen_europes_next_challenge_korski/

As 2010 begins, a number of foreign policy issues are already vying for top-level attention. But one is bound to be taken much more seriously in 2010 than last year: Yemen. Unrest in the south, a rebellion in the north, a new generation of al-Qaeda operatives and a youthful, unemployed population set to double by 2025 means the country will have to move from the speechwriters’ repertoire to the policy-makers’ in-tray.

Yemen received renewed attention over the New Year’s holiday as it transpired that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian terrorist who tried to blow up an airplane over Detroit, trained at a Yemeni al-Qaeda camp. Over the weekend, the US, Britain and Spain took the unusual step of closing their embassies for fear or a terrorist attack.

Why Yemen?

The link between Yemen and al-Qaeda is close. The Bin Ladens hail from the village of al-Rubat in the Hadramaut region. The al-Qaeda chief’s fourth wife is Yemeni and he has often referred to the importance of the country, noting the Prophet Muhammad’s regard for Yemen because of its quick adoption of Islam after the faith’s establishment. But the links go further.

Yemen was second only to Saudi Arabia as a source of the anti-Soviet mujahedeen fighters. Thousands of Yemenis trained in al-Qaeda’s camps and President Saleh subsequently recruited these veterans in the war against southern Yemen. This trend continued after the civil war, with Bosnian and Chechen veterans — and, recently, Iraqi insurgents — being integrated into the Yemeni army. Today, Yemeni prisoners make up one of the largest national contingents of detainees at Guantanamo Bay.

But the al-Qaeda link is only one of a number of reasons Yemen will occupy policy-makers in 2010. A longstanding conflict in northern Yemen between the government and a rebel group, known as the Houthis after their leader’s clan, drew in Saudi Arabia last month when the rebels seized a sliver of Saudi territory, prompting Riyadh to launch a cross-border military strike. Saudi Arabia’s intervention, in turn, prompted talk of Iranian support for the rebels. What is clear is that this year’s fighting has been some of the fiercest since the conflict erupted in June 2004 when government forces sought to arrest the rebel leader, Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi.

In addition, the Yemeni government is now also facing increased unrest in the south. The Yemen Arab Republic (north) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (south) unified in 1990, to form the Republic of Yemen. But the unitary state was threatened when civil war broke out in 1994, with southern leaders calling for secession. Thousands were killed in fierce fighting which ended with the defeat of the southern leaders represented mainly by the Yemeni Socialist Party. Since then, two key issues have kept southern grievances alive – land grabs by powerful officials from the north following the civil war, and the exclusion of southern officials from top government jobs.

If that was not bad enough, Yemen faces a long-term economic crisis. Its respectable 3.9 percent average annual growth from 2000-2007 has been primarily due to an increase in oil production and prices, while revenues have yet to be invested in employment-generating, non-extractive sectors.

It will take considerable effort to help address this multifaceted challenge, not least because of the sometimes difficult relationship between the West and the Yemeni government. Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh is usually described as pro-Western, but the truth is more complex. Yemen’s political leadership has since the mid-1990s followed a delicate balancing act to maintain power, and sought to co-opt tribal factions by bringing them into government and involving them in the democratic process while expanding the president’s personal and familial control over state structures and resources.

Breaking with powerful figures, even those connected to al-Qaeda, is therefore balanced with other interests. When the U.S asked the Yemeni president to hand-over Sheikh Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, who figures on the UN’s terrorist list, he refused. Sheikh Zindani was Rector of al-Imam University, and a key opposition party figure – therefore untouchable. On other occasions it has been the US, which has balked at taking action, dictated by commercial links that exist between the U.S and Yemen; it was Hunt Oil, a Texan-based company and long-time Republican backer, which originally discovered oil in Yemen, in 1984 and remains an investor in a large Yemeni LNG project.

What should Europe do?

European governments and the EU ought still to be in a good position to help Yemen address its many problems. European support for the country has increased steadily over the years. In the last six years, the EU donated more than € 144 million with the largest share going towards economic development. European foreign ministers have also been seized of Yemen’s problems for longer than the mainstream media; in October, they expressed “deep concern” over the deteriorating situation. Finally, key EU governments have long since operated bilateral assistance programmes to support the Yemeni police and coast guards.

Yet despite this, Europe’s support to Yemen looks like the kind of pre-Lisbon offerings that EU leaders have been keen to move away from: it is mainly technocratic, developmental with the security-related programmes undertaken bilaterally by EU governments. It will be key to build on this assistance in the next six months, so that the range of the EU’s instruments — diplomatic, political, security and developmental — can be brought to bear on the crisis.

Though the EU has upgraded the chief of its delegation to a fully-fledged ambassador, it may opportune for Lady Catherine Ashton to appoint a senior EU envoy to the Gulf Region — or tap an EU foreign minister, like Germany’s Guido Westerwelle — who could consult with the different parties and draft a new programme of EU assistance.

An early task for a European envoy will be to push for greater involvement of the GCC in Yemen’s stabilisation. The Gulf states have mediated in Lebanon’s conflict and negotiated with the Taliban, but have been reluctant to engage themselves in Yemen. Yet their involvement will be important to help bring the various Yemeni parties – the Government, the Opposition, the Southern secessionists and the Huthi rebels – into some kind peace-like process. Results may not be obtained for years, but it will nonetheless pay for the EU to show early engagement and to consult the local and regional parties at a senior level.

Though there is likely to be limited appetite for an official CSDP mission, an innovative programme of assistance that includes out-of-country training for Yemeni officials, as conducted by EUJUST LEX in Iraq, and the co-location of trainers in key ministries, such as undertaken by the EU in Bosnia-Herzegovina, would complement the mooted US increase in counter-terrorism assistance.

Such an assistance programme could be unveiled at summit of the European leaders and Gulf state Heads of Governments, with support for Yemen at the top of the agenda. Depending on the willingness of the other Gulf states to engage (and Yemen’s acceptance of their engagement) it may even be possible to explore a joint EU-GCC project based in Sana’a, for example on border, or maritime security.

Yemen’s multiple conflicts may not yet be “ripe” for resolution, as many of the local and regional actors seem reluctant to accept that force is unlikely to work in their favour. Even when they are ready to talk, for example about holding elections or decentralisation from the Sanaa government to the north and south, it will be because regional players exert influence on and in Yemen. But the potential for collapse and the considerable presence of al-Qaeda means the EU cannot waste time. Based on its on-going development assistance, the EU, led by High Representative Catherine Ashton, and an EU envoy, should engage local and regional leaders, and develop a multi-pronged programme of assistance.

Always something between Erbil and Baghdad

Kurdistan Alliance officials have said certain clauses in the draft 2010 budget law constitute an attempt to pressure the Kurdistan Regional Government because of oil contracts signed with global companies. Abd-al-Muhsin al-Sa’dun, member of the Kurdistan Alliance Bloc, has said that some clauses refer to imposing sanctions on governorates and regions where oil pumping stops for certain reasons. Back in October Kurdistan stopped oil exports because of continuing disputes with Baghdad. Though oil from the north may have to be exported through Iraqi government pipelines running to Turkey, giving Baghdad a stranglehold on the transport of oil produced there, Iraq needs all the revenue it can get to finance its reconstruction, civil service, and the provision of basic services.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/13/world/middleeast/13iraqoil.html

Organisations deemed subversive by Iran

Iranian Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi says dozens of foreign organizations that attempted to create havoc in the Islamic Republic have been identified.

http://www.presstv.ir/classic/detail.aspx?id=114435&sectionid=351020101

80 have been identified, 60 are listed below.

1. The Soros Foundation,
2. The Woodrow Wilson Centre
3. The Freedom House
4. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED)
5. The National Democratic Institute (NDI)
6. The National Republican Institute (NRI)
7. The Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe (based in Warsaw)
8. The East European Democratic Centre (EEDC)
9. The Ford Foundation
10. Rockefeller Brothers Fund
11. The Hoover Institution, Stanford University
12. The Dutch HIVOS Foundation
13. UK’s MENAS
14. The United Nations Association of the USA
15. The Carnegie Foundation
16. UK’s Wilton Park
17. The Search for Common Ground Organization
18. The Population Council
19. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
20. The Aspen Institute
21. The American Enterprise Institute
22. The New American Foundation
23. The Smith Richardson Foundation
24. The German Marshall Fund (with offices in Germany, Belgium )
25. The Centre for Peaceful Solutions
26. The Abdolrahman Boroumand Foundation
27. The University of Yale
28. The Meridian International Centre
29. The Foundation for Democracy in Iran
30. The International Republican Institute
31. The National Democratic Institute
32. The American Innovation Institute
33. The Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe [presumably a repeat]
34. The USAID
35. Center for International Private Enterprise
36. American Center for International Labor Solidarity
37. The International Centre for Democratic Transition (ICDT)
38. Association for Union Democracy [Persian: Anjoman-e Tashakkol-e democracy]
39. The Albert Einstein Institution
40. The World Movement for Democracy
41. The Young Activists Network
42. The Democracy Intelligence Group and IT [name as published]
43. The International Movement of Parliamentarians for Democracy (IMPD)
44. The Network of Democracy Research Institutes
45. The Rega [or Riga] Institution
46. The Berkman Center
47. The American Council on Foreign Relations
48. Germany’s Foreign Policy Association
49. Israeli Memri centre
50. The University of Yale and all its affiliations
51. The British Centre for Democratic Studies
52. The Meridian International Institute
53. The American National Defence Academy
54. The Iran Human Rights Documentation Center
55. The American FLTA Centre in Central Asia, Caucasus [name as published]
56. The Committee on the Present Danger
57. The Brookings Institution
58. The Saban Center for Middle East Policy – Brookings Institution
59. The Human Rights Watch
60. The New America Foundation

Source: http://www.akhbar-rooz.com/news.jsp?essayId=26259

Iraq Oil Exports up by 4%

Iraq Dec Oil Exports Up 4% On Month At 1.977 Million B/D

http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/stock-market-news-story.aspx?storyid=201001040338dowjonesdjonline000062&title=iraq-dec-oil-exports-up-4on-month-at-1977-million-b/d

Iraq’s crude oil exports in December were up 4% at 1.977 million barrels a day, compared with 1.902 million barrels a day in November, an Iraqi oil industry source said Monday.

He said that Iraq exported in December an average of 1.534 million barrels a day from the southern Basra oil terminal, up from 1.498 million barrels a day in November.

Some 433,000 barrels a day were exported from Kirkuk oil fields in northern Iraq via the Turkish port of Ceyhan. The remaining 10,000 barrels a day were exported to Jordan via trucks, he added.

Iraq’s crude oil exports have slowed down below the 2 million barrels-a-day target since September due to attacks on the northern export pipeline. In December, an attack on the pipeline suspended exports via the northern pipeline for a few days. Similar attacks took place in October and September. Iraq usually exports 480,000 barrels a day via that pipeline.

Sadrist Bloc becomes the Free People Bloc

The Sadrist Bloc will run in the upcoming parliamentary elections as the Free People Bloc (Al-Ahrar Bloc); the bloc is made up of other independent candidates and not just those from the Sadrist trend. The head of the bloc is Nassar al-Rubay’i. The Sadrists presented their democratic colourings when they held primary elections back in October, the so far only party to do so in Iraq.

Iraq oil minister Hussain al-Shahristani under fire

Hussain al-Shahristani is under fire for attempting to replace the current director of the Iraqi North Oil Company with an aide of his who, ostensibly, is a loyal political and economic partner.

Staff at North Oil threatened to go on strike and halt oil production if he goes ahead. According to Dubai’s Al-Sharqiyah, North Oil employees criticised Shahristani for appointing his own, personal, aides in the oil ministry and Iraq’s oil companies for the purposes of influencing the country’s oil contracts and revenues for personal and party-political purposes.

The Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) was founded in 1966 by the Iraqi government. It was empowered to operate all aspects of the oil industry in Iraq except for refining which was already being run by the Oil Refineries Administration (1952) and local distribution which was also already under government control.

Iraq to have media city

The Baghdad government recently announced plans to build a media centre in the city which will contain TV producing centers, news channels centers, filming studios, producing services centers, and hotels for foreign journalists. More information can be found here

However:

    According to Arab media reports, the Transparency League, a monitoring committee in Iraq, has warned that the project will be a “prison” that restricts press and other freedoms. A statement from the organisation, says news channels, states that security agencies do not want the public to know of human rights violations, the failure of government and security agencies, and the corruption of ministries and senior officials.

Peter Galbraith statement on activities in Kurdistan

A Statement on My Activities in Kurdistan
Peter W. Galbraith

http://blogs.nybooks.com/post/287979881/a-statement-on-my-activities-in-kurdistan

Recent reports on my activities in Kurdistan call for a response. I have been both a writer on Iraq and an active participant in events there. After being an eyewitness to Saddam Hussein’s genocide against the Kurds in the 1980s, I came to the view that the Iraqi Kurdish aspiration for independence was morally justified and the only sure means of protecting the Kurdish people. In late 2003 and early 2004, I helped Kurdistan’s leaders draft a proposal for a self-governing Kurdistan that was submitted to the Coalition Provisional Authority on February 11, 2004, for inclusion in Iraq’s interim constitution. Under the proposal, Kurdistan had its own government and military, Kurdistan law prevailed over Iraqi law, and Kurdistan controlled its own natural resources, including oil.

As Kurdistan’s leaders recognized, legal control over oil meant nothing unless there was a Kurdistan oil industry. In June 2004, I helped bring DNO, a Norwegian oil company, into Kurdistan. I was paid by DNO and entered into a financial arrangement with the company through a Delaware partnership, Porcupine LP. That year DNO discovered oil in Kurdistan and its pioneering efforts have attracted more than thirty other companies, creating a robust Kurdistan oil industry and giving the Kurds the financial basis for meaningful self-government.

In the summer of 2005, Kurdistan’s leaders asked me to advise them on the negotiations for the permanent constitution. Their proposal was identical to the one they made in February 2004 and they achieved virtually all of it. In its November 12, 2009 article, The New York Times says that I “pushed through” these constitutional provisions for my own benefit. The Times gave no source for this allegation and its reporter never asked me about it.

As even a superficial analysis would show, the allegation could not possibly be true. I was a private citizen, unconnected to any government and with no power to push through anything. I was not directly involved in any negotiations and was not in the room when they took place. I simply provided advice, unpaid and on an informal basis, to the Kurdish leaders, who knew of my arrangements with DNO when they asked for my advice. The Kurds, who had been fighting for independence or autonomy for eighty years, had set the agenda and they pushed through their own proposals. Although the Times asserts that my relationship with DNO was largely undeclared, it was also known to the US and Iraqi governments and I represented the company on a joint committee with the Iraqi Ministry of Oil.

A separate issue arises over what I should have disclosed in connection with my articles in The New York Review of Books. I discussed Kurdistan’s autonomy proposals, including those on oil, in a piece written in March 2004 entitled “How to Get Out of Iraq.” At this time, I did not have any business relationships. Subsequently, I wrote several other articles in 2004 and 2005, some of which briefly discussed the oil issue, and did not mention my business arrangements. These arrangements were covered by confidentiality agreements, but I should have stated that I had business interests in Kurdistan. I regret not having done so and apologize to the editors and readers of The New York Review of Books. In my later articles, I did state that I was “a principal at the Windham Resources Group, a firm that negotiates on behalf of its clients in post-conflict societies, including in Iraq.”

In June 2009, I joined the United Nations as deputy special representative of the secretary-general in Afghanistan. At that time, I terminated all my business activities. Neither I nor Porcupine LP has any ongoing contractual relationship or financial arrangement with DNO. We do not hold an interest in any Iraqi oil field. Porcupine is the plaintiff in an arbitration with DNO related to past disputes from which I may or may not benefit. When I was appointed to the UN position, I disclosed all my financial interests, including those related to the Porcupine-DNO arbitration.

This statement appears in the January 14, 2010 issue of The New York Review of Books.

Iraq government bans alcohol in Green Zone

Oliver August of the Times reports here that the Iraqi government has banned the sale and transport of alcohol in the Green Zone.

Here are a few excerpts for your amusement:

“The Iraqi Government has banned alcohol in Baghdad’s heavily fortified green zone, home to foreign embassies and some legendary drunken parties in recent years.”

“Senior Iraqi officials living in the green zone are not exempt from the new rules. Abdul Bari al-Zebari, a Kurdish member of parliament, was forced to give up two bottles of Chilean red when stopped by guards at the entrance to his residential compound.”

“In the past few years, the compounds that make up this part of central Baghdad have been the site of bacchanalian revelry reminiscent of 19th-century colonial life. Stumbling fully clothed into one of Saddam’s palace pools was a rite of passage for young neoconservative Americans sent over after the invasion.”

“One South African security guard is said to have threatened an Iraqi police officer with a gun during a stand-off over a bottle of Smirnoff. “Baghdad is hard enough when you’re medicated,” said a senior European diplomat.”

Iraq bombs could kill democracy

This piece appeared in the Guardian on Monday, one day after the devastating attacks in Baghdad that killed at least 200 and injured hundreds more. The Islamic State of Iraq, a Sunni extremist group that includes al Qaeda in Iraq, has claimed responsibility for the twin bombings that targeted government buildings including the ministry of municipalities and the justice ministry.

Note however that the blame-game is prevalent in Iraq; in the Bloody Wednesday attacks of August 19 for example, the Iraqi government blamed Syrian based Baathists yet the Islamic State of Iraq claimed responsibility for those attacks too. Further, Iraqi officials also pointed to Iranian complicity but this fell on deaf ears.

Major General Ata [spokesman for the Baghdad Operations Command] told Al-Iraqiya TV that eleven officers and 50 cadres from security agencies in Al-Salihiyah [in Baghdad] have been detained – this re-affirms the point made many times before on this blog, in the below article and others before it, that the terrorists must have had inside help. You do not get so close to government ministries without having the checkpoints on the payroll.

Iraq bombs could kill democracy

Two terrorist attacks in Baghdad yesterday killed more than 150 people and injured hundreds. The perpetrators, reported by the Iraqi government to be Sunni extremist Ba’athist elements and/or al-Qaida operatives, once again hit the heart of Baghdad’s political district, as they did on 19 August.

Yesterday’s bombings, like the August bombings, were sophisticated and calculated and were almost certainly facilitated with domestic and/or transnational help from the powerful and influential. The terrorists managed to enter an ultra-sensitive area, preceded by security checkpoints and increased restrictions, with explosives powerful enough to sweep away the blast walls that protected the government buildings and destroy anything and anyone that stood in proximity. One also has to ask how the attackers were able to get their hands on such explosives in the first place.

A broad analysis suggests complicity on the part of the Sunni-Arab world: keep Iraq unstable and you stop the country from becoming an effective Iranian client state when the US withdraws; or, at the very least, facilitate terrorist attacks in the country and you have some form of a counter-measure to Iran’s unmatched influence. Alternatively, the attacks on Kurdish-run and Shia-run ministries may have sought to encourage incorporation of the Sunnis, specifically the Sons of Iraq fighters, into the Shia-led government, which has so far been slow in doing so. The objectives are not necessarily independent of each other.

A more straightforward analysis suggests prime minister Nouri al-Maliki as the prime target of all this: destabilise Iraq in the run-up to January’s parliamentary elections and you hurt Maliki’s chances of success, as he will be campaigning on the same security platform that won him this year’s provincial elections. Indeed, things are not looking too rosy for the premier now that he has lost his security card. Iraqis will struggle to list his achievements in recent times and find the country no closer to better services and increased employment levels.

The Iraqi premier could prefer to have the elections postponed altogether, which may be likely in the light of ongoing disputes over a new election law. This would provide an opportunity to improve on security and strengthen his new State of Law coalition, which is not what he wanted or what others expected. It includes Sunnis, Kurds and Shias but no prominent or representative ones.

Notably, and despite previous predictions, Maliki failed to get popular Sunnis such as Ahmed Abu Risha on board. Could this be linked to his attacks on the Ba’athists? Possibly. Reports in Iraq also suggest Abu Risha was pressured by Saudi Arabia and Jordan to refrain from joining Maliki’s coalition (Maliki’s Islamic Dawa Party was exiled in Iran in the late 1980s and enjoyed funds and backing from Tehran).

Maliki needs something quick and effective; electoral success does after all come down to perception. Maliki has exhausted with no positive result the nationalistic rhetoric against the Syrian government, which he accuses of harbouring Ba’athists and complicity in Baghdad’s deadly attacks.

In the past, the premier steeped up security operations: in mid-2008 he controversially arrested hundreds of Sons of Iraq fighters in Baquba of Diyala province and detained political rivals in the area. In the same province, he played to anti-Kurdish sentiments by conducting so-called security operations in the disputed territory of Khanaqin, creating a dangerous standoff with Kurdish security forces (responsible for maintaining security there at the time). Maliki failed to win Diyala province in the provincial elections but his actions will have nevertheless successfully played to anti-Kurdish and nationalistic sentiments elsewhere in the country. This time round, similar security operations could also follow yesterday’s attacks. Clashes by the Syrian-Iraqi border should not be ruled out.

However, the ultimate victim could yet be Iraq’s nascent democracy. That is unless disputes over the election law are resolved and the elections take place as scheduled.

More important still is restoring voter confidence in the electoral process. Anything less will hand a decisive victory to the terrorists. Increased attacks could also increase the chances of retaliatory strikes by the Shia community against the Sunnis, taking Iraq back to the sectarian warfare of previous years (Shia political and religious forces have so far exercised commendable restraint).

But this is assuming Sunni extremists are deemed responsible for the attacks in the first place. If the attacks really were the product of intra-Shia disputes, with Maliki’s coalition up against the pro-Iranian Iraqi National Alliance (which Maliki refused to join much to the dismay of Iran), then Iraq is at a very frightening point indeed.