Ranj Alaaldin

Libya: time to decide | openDemocracy | Ranj Alaaldin

Providing air support and arms for the Libyan opposition is necessary if stalemate and partition are to be avoided, argues Ranj Alaaldin

Libya’s opposition forces still need outside help. After making rapid progress and re-capturing the eastern strategic towns of Ajdabiya and Ras Lanuf over the weekend they are, once again, on the retreat and yesterday lost the oil-town of Ras Lanuf to Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s regime loyalists.

Having gathered in London on Tuesday the time has now come for the dithering members of the allied forces and the broader international community to decide which side of the fence they sit on: either replace the certainty of tyranny with the uncertain politics of a post-Gaddafi Libya or prolong Gaddafi’s grip on power and face a set of dangerous and potentially insurmountable consequences.

The dithering over these two choices will allow Gaddafi to consolidate his position, regain the momentum and pursue brutal retribution; it will also provide for what many states regard as the worst possible outcome: the partitioning of Libya. Turkey and others in the Arab world have, in particular, been vocal with their concerns toward the actual or de-facto partitioning of Libya. Yet, their refusal to accept the reality on the ground and the need for the West to go all the way ensures their concerns will soon be realised.

If Libya is to avoid partition and if civilian populations are to be protected, then coalition forces must act toward an objective that guarantees them both: the removal of Gaddafi and his regime. This does not mean it has to actually target Gaddafi, his family or other regime loyalists, not least those within the security establishment, but it does mean the other less costly and politically sensitive option has to be pursued and that is the arming of the rebels combined with continued airsupport for the rebels as they advance to the west.

Anything less will either, firstly, allow Gaddafi to regroup, bide his time and then take the rebels and international forces back to square one and on the retreat – or, secondly, pave the way for a protracted conflict dominated by tit-for-tat infantry clashes, ambushes and, in essence, the feared West-East divide that lies around the corner.

Of course, the West can choose to carry on in its current form and hope that it can still achieve its objectives. That is, continue to enforce the no-fly zone, as well as the no-drive zone (though Nato is still indecisive even about this as it takes control of operations) and prevent Gaddafi’s jets and tanks from advancing toward the East. In theory, this ensures the rebels are protected from any major regime advances toward their strongholds; it is also pursuant to the strict interpretation of the terms of Security Council Resolution 1973, making it politically appealing.

The uncertainty that stems from this policy, however, comes from the possibility that it will merely provide for a stalemate whereby neither the regime nor the rebels are able to make any significant progress. It provides, in essence, for a policing role that divides the West from the East and one that requires months, possibly years, of commitment, which is by no means guaranteed given the fissures already apparent within the coalition. Even if Western forces were able to commit to continue such measures, Gaddafi will, over time, successfully penetrate the sensitive political and diplomatic dynamics of his enemies. In other words, a Western policing role is not guaranteed to be sustainable.

Additionally, Gaddafi will resort to other effective tactics like the deployment of paramilitary forces – disguised as civilians or otherwise – to infiltrate opposition-controlled territory, undermine the opposition and its own internal problems and kill significant opposition leaders. Even if it takes years, gaps will, over time, appear for Gaddafi to exploit with the aim of destabilising and retaking the East.

Further, this scenario gives Gaddafi legitimacy; it will encourage other despots to suppress dissent in a similar fashion and leaves a problem that will fester and require the West to come back to in the future. It is for these reasons that Nato member Turkey’s offer to mediate a ceasefire is counter-intuitive to the extreme, not least since Gaddafi himself has crushed any real chances of having a genuine ceasefire as a result of his devious and disingenuous actions.

This is why arming the rebels is both feasible and effective. Opposition forces are, currently, too weak to be able to force Gaddafi from power. The West may pin its hopes on a mass defection within the army and an uprising in Tripoli but it has become clear that this is no longer likely. Gaddafi still has enough hard currency and sits on enough resources to maintain his network of patronage in Tripoli, buy the loyalty of the military, tribal leaders and so intimidate the people into submission.

This is not to suggest that progress by the opposition does not have the potential to encourage others to join their ranks. But the hesitant and still undecided segments within Libya must be convinced that the opposition is in fact the winning horse; for that to happen, the opposition must first look like one.

Coalition governments have so far resisted the politically charged and opportunistic demands to define what the so-called end-game will be, this is wise since it is difficult to predict exactly how things will develop and astute since Gaddafi should not be given any glimpse of what allied plans are. It is necessary though to prepare for the various potential scenarios that could unfold over the coming weeks but, more importantly, it is better to avoid half-thought out measures, like Turkey’s offer on Sunday to broker a ceasefire or giving Gaddafi the option to leave Libya (which only offers him a lifeline). These weaken the resolve of the coalition, shows weakness on the part of allied forces and send all the wrong signals to a regime that has already defied the odds against it.

The interim national council, formed by opposition groups in Libya, has said it will hold free and fair elections and draft a national constitution. Here is its eight-point plan in full.

The interim national council hereby presents its vision for rebuilding the democratic state of Libya. This vision responds to the needs and aspirations of our people, while incorporating the historical changes brought about by the 17 February revolution.

We have learnt from the struggles of our past during the dark days of dictatorship that there is no alternative to building a free and democratic society and ensuring the supremacy of international humanitarian law and human rights declarations. This can only be achieved through dialogue, tolerance, co-operation, national cohesiveness and the active participation of all citizens. As we are familiar with being ruled by the authoritarian dictatorship of one man, the political authority that we seek must represent the free will of the people, without exclusion or suppression of any voice.

The lessons of our past will outline our social contract through the need to respect the interests of all groups and classes that comprise the fabric of our society and not compromise the interests of one at the expense of the other. It is this social contract that must lead us to a civil society that recognises intellectual and political pluralism and allows for the peaceful transfer of power through legal institutions and ballot boxes; in accordance with a national constitution crafted by the people and endorsed in a referendum.

To that end, we will outline our aspirations for a modern, free and united state, following the defeat of the illegal Gaddafi regime. The interim national council will be guided by the following in our continuing march to freedom, through espousing the principles of political democracy. We recognise without reservation our obligation to:

1. Draft a national constitution that clearly defines its nature, essence and purpose and establishes legal, political, civil, legislative, executive and judicial institutions. The constitution will also clarify the rights and obligations of citizens in a transparent manner, thus separating and balancing the three branches of legislative, executive and judicial powers.

2. Form political organisations and civil institutions including the formation of political parties, popular organisations, unions, societies and other civil and peaceful associations.

3. Maintain a constitutional civil and free state by upholding intellectual and political pluralism and the peaceful transfer of power, opening the way for genuine political participation, without discrimination.

4. Guarantee every Libyan citizen, of statutory age, the right to vote in free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections, as well as the right to run for office.

5. Guarantee and respect the freedom of expression through media, peaceful protests, demonstrations and sit-ins and other means of communication, in accordance with the constitution and its laws in a way that protects public security and social peace.

6. A state that draws strength from our strong religious beliefs in peace, truth, justice and equality.

7. Political democracy and the values of social justice, which include:

a. The nation’s economy to be used for the benefit of the Libyan people by creating effective economic institutions in order to eradicate poverty and unemployment – working towards a healthy society, a green environment and a prosperous economy.

b. The development of genuine economic partnerships between a strong and productive public sector, a free private sector and a supportive and effective civil society, which overstands corruption and waste.

c. Support the use of science and technology for the betterment of society, through investments in education, research and development, thus enabling the encouragement of an innovative culture and enhancing the spirit of creativity. Focus on emphasising individual rights in a way that guarantees social freedoms that were denied to the Libyan people during the rule of dictatorship. In addition to building efficient public and private institutions and funds for social care, integration and solidarity, the state will guarantee the rights and empowerment of women in all legal, political, economic and cultural spheres.

d. A constitutional civil state which respects the sanctity of religious doctrine and condemns intolerance, extremism and violence that are manufactured by certain political, social or economic interests. The state to which we aspire will denounce violence, terrorism, intolerance and cultural isolation; while respecting human rights, rules and principles of citizenship and the rights of minorities and those most vulnerable. Every individual will enjoy the full rights of citizenship, regardless of colour, gender, ethnicity or social status.

8. Build a democratic Libya whose international and regional relationships will be based upon:

a. The embodiment of democratic values and institutions which respects its neighbours, builds partnerships and recognises the independence and sovereignty of other nations. The state will also seek to enhance regional integration and international co-operation through its participation with members of the international community in achieving international peace and security.

b. A state which will uphold the values of international justice, citizenship, the respect of international humanitarian law and human rights declarations, as well as condemning authoritarian and despotic regimes. The interests and rights of foreign nationals and companies will be protected. Immigration, residency and citizenship will be managed by government institutions, respecting the principles and rights of political asylum and public liberties.

c. A state which will join the international community in rejecting and denouncing racism, discrimination and terrorism while strongly supporting peace, democracy and freedom.

Urban life and intermarriage undermine the colonel’s base

The Gadaffi regime took journalists to Warfalla stronghold to demonstrate the people’s continued support, but tribal loyalty may no longer hold sway In a desperate bid to parade local support, Colonel Gadaffi’s regime last week took foreign journalists to Bani Walid, about 100 miles southeast of Tripoli, writes Richard Woods.

The town, a stronghold of the Warfalla tribe, had been seized by protesters in the early days of the uprising and rebels had sprayed graffiti on buildings. One had urged: “Kill Gadaffi.” The regime hoped to demonstrate that its inhabitants had seen the error of their ways.

The graffiti had been erased, and in a hotel Dr Mbrak Ibrahim, a British-educated engineer, spoke fervently of his admiration for the dictator. “Without Gadaffi I would never have been able to travel to England for my education,” he enthused, displaying a photograph of Tony Blair and Gadaffi on his mobile phone.

He rejected any suggestion that the Warfalla people had ever turned against Gadaffi. “There was never any problem here,” he said.

Other men in the town expressed similar sentiments. The propaganda was blunt — it’s likely that the men had been coerced or bribed into supporting Gadaffi — but raised complex questions. Are tribal loyalties going to play a key role in the struggle for power? Can Gadaffi buy or extort tribal allegiance to bolster his position?

A host of tribes populate Libya’s turbulent history. In the east, the Sa’adi tribes supported the rule of Gadaffi’s predecessor, King Idris. When Idris was overthrown in 1969, the Sa’adi tribes’ power diminished.

In their place came Gadaffi and his relatively small tribe — the Gadadaffa in central Libya — who sought support from two larger groups, the Warfalla in the west and the Megaraha in the south.

To consolidate his grip on power, Gadaffi gave key posts to members of his family and tribe, and to allies such as Abdullah al-Sanussi, a member of the Megaraha who became the head of Gadaffi’s security organisations.

Given such a background, tribes might seem to hold vital influence. Proponents of this view note that early in the uprising one Warfalla leader told Al Jazeera TV : “We tell the brother Gadaffi, well, he is no longer a brother. We tell him to leave the country.”

Another member of the tribe anonymously told a US reporter: “The Warfalla, like their brethren the Zinata [another tribe], are boiling. The only reason we have not seen them participate in combat is lack of weapons.They are simply outgunned.”

Ranj Alaaldin, senior analyst at the Next Century Foundation and Middle East expert at the London School of Economics, argues that Gadaffi’s own actions indicate the continuing importance of tribes.

“He has made every effort to offer them economic privileges and coerce them into supporting the regime. Having said that, not all the tribes are cohesive.”

That lack of cohesion, argue other experts, means the overall conflict is not going to divide along tribal lines. Some members of the Warfalla, for example, are in Benghazi, siding with the rebels, whose newly appointed leader is Mahmoud Jibril.

Over the past century, including the 42 years of Gadaffi’s rule, much has changed in Libya’s tribal landscape. Dr Richard Barltrop, a Middle East expert with Oxford Analytica, a consultancy group, plays down the tribal influence. “People have exaggerated the degree to which Gadaffi’s rule has depended on controlling support of particular tribes,” he said.

“Foreign analysts reach much too readily for tribe as a determining factor. The reality is that if you talk to Libyans, they will say, yes, tribes matter and people have affiliations, but it’s not much different from other countries.”

Barltrop points out that more than 85% of Libya’s 6m people now live in urban areas; intermarriage between members of different tribes has been going on for decades; and education has proceeded apace. The result: tribal influence is waning.

“The reality now is that there has been great urbanisation and intermixing,” said Barltrop, who noted that similar tribal divisions existed in Egypt but had played little part in the revolution there.

Sir Richard Dalton, a former ambassador to Libya, agrees. “I found that Libyans made up their own minds about issues rather than thinking of them along tribal lines,” he said.

True, specific subjects fired up tribal passions, such as the case of the Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset al-Megrahi. When Gadaffi surrendered Megrahi to justice, his tribe, the Megaraha, were furious.

However, Dalton said: “I have spoken to many Libyans about this and they say tribal loyalty is now not a huge component.” Instead, what counted in Gadaffi’s regime was “fear and money”.

Can such forces be beaten by hopes of democracy? Last week Abdul Salam, a journalist in Tripoli, suggested they could. “The tribes play only a limited role,” he said. “First and foremost we are Libyan.”

The Economist magazine debates whether the West should keep out of the Arab world’s revolutions, expert insight from Ranj Alaaldin, Senior analyst, Next Century Foundation

Click here for the debate in full

The revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa necessitate a re-examining of the way in which we approach and engage with this debate on interventionism. The revolutions, and protests in general, have been wholly indigenous and executed with the active support of the vast majority of citizens in the states in which they took place and continue to take place. They are, therefore, unprecedented and consequently require us to reassess our position in these unique circumstances, just as much as the Arab people have dramatically changed and re-examined their position in the balance of power between state and citizen.

Both participants provide traditional perspectives that have shaped the debate on Western involvement in the affairs of the Arab world. They are representative of a much broader audience currently engaged in the debate unfolding here. Sir Menzies Campbell is right to point out that we share the same principles and objectives as the people of the region and that this, combined with our experiences in the nation-building process, should compel us to assist our counterparts in the Arab world. Nevertheless, as As’ad AbuKhalil points out, our track record in this endeavour has not been consistent and the people we seek to assist have generally regarded our intentions with suspicion.

I propose here a different perspective that bridges the two. The West can and must intervene in the Arab revolutions not necessarily with the aim of implementing and forcing through revolution, reform or regime change, but, rather, to ensure that their proponents and architects, the Arab people themselves, are protected from being maimed and massacred by governments that have the capacity and willingness to indiscriminately and brutally suppress legitimate demands for freedom and human rights.

The democratisation protests in the Arab world can be divided into three groups: first, those that can lead, and have led, to revolution through relatively peaceful means; second, those that are unlikely to lead to revolution without some form of violence or violent uprising; third, those that are more likely to lead to reform, rather than revolution.

These scenarios do, of course, have the potential to morph into one or the other. The West must, consequently, measure its response according to how things stand and develop on the ground. To adopt a single position and approach would be counter-intuitive, reckless and morally reprehensible.

Western intervention in any instance can be peaceful and/or forceful; and both can have the same capacity to positively influence and assist.

In Egypt, for example, Western inaction ensured the revolution remained indigenous and, therefore, impossible to undermine by the Egyptian regime and other anti-revolutionary state and non-state actors, both within and beyond Egypt. At the same time, and in line with the objective outlined above, it was Western action behind the scenes, diplomatically and in the form of leverage over the Egyptian military, that ensured the revolution was achieved peacefully. Contrary to expectations, including my own, former president Hosni Mubarak, even with his back to the wall, was unable to reverse his misfortune by viciously clamping down on the protests. The West’s role is often understated in this context; it was not the most crucial element but it was, nevertheless, crucial in saving lives and facilitating the revolutionary process.

Unlike the Egyptians, the Libyans have not been so lucky. Muammar Qaddafi will not crumble under international pressure. Unlike Mr Mubarak, Mr Qaddafi is not willing to maintain ties with the West at the expense of his own survival; there is no red line for the dictator and everything and everyone were and remain dispensable. Hence, what started off as a movement on the ground that later turned into a violent uprising that looked set to defeat Mr Qaddafi, without outside assistance, became an enterprise that, but for Western involvement, would have led to the massacre of tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of Libyans.

Western military intervention, had, therefore, become a necessity in Libya and returned the momentum to opposition forces. Yet it was a necessity dictated by the Arab people themselves with indifference to the involvement of the UN and the ineffective Arab League. For once, the moral imperative to act has been determined not by Western policymakers, Western adventurists or non-representative Arab leaders, but by the Arab people.

It is on this basis that the Libyan crisis and the Arab people have set a precedent and a firm basis on which military intervention is necessary, right and should be welcomed. That precedent provides as follows: that military intervention should take place first, where there is a possibility that thousands are at risk of being killed; second, where the target regime has no intention of ceasing violence and heeding the demands of the people; and third, where the people of the target country itself demand it, though this may not always be easy to ascertain.

These conditions are not so much centred on whether we should militarily intervene but, rather, when to militarily intervene. What form this military intervention should take—for example, whether we should enforce a no-fly zone or commit ground troops—depends on the circumstances of the day and the capabilities of the opposition forces themselves. This may at times prove challenging, particularly when considered within politically restrictive parameters, but the revolutions and protests so far have made this a relatively straightforward task.

Nor are these conditions for intervention unique, given previous calls throughout history for Western military intervention by the oppressed. But what makes circumstances different this time round is that the call for intervention by the people of the region is combined with a broad-based, concerted and active effort, by the same people, to unite and act against dictatorship. It is against this backdrop that our approach to military intervention and, as I have outlined above, intervention in general, must be re-examined.

The people of the Arab world have, so far, largely determined whether we should intervene in the revolutions and what form this intervention should take, as they take hold of their destiny. We should stick by them.

Why the West finally got it right | Christian Science Monitor | Ranj Alaaldin

British Prime Minister David Cameron has done it. He was among the first of Western leaders and British politicians to call for the much-needed no-fly zone over Libya. Despite strong opposition from the international community, he stood firm and loyal to his convictions and, together with the equally tenacious President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, has restored faith in the once-impotent and futile United Nations. Libyans, the Arab world, and the broader international community should forever be grateful.

Yesterday’s Security Council endorsement of a resolution that imposes a no-fly zone over Libya is a righting of the wrongs of history. In 1991, the international community and the ineffective Arab League found itself in a similar position when Iraqis rose up against the tyrannical dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. They left the Iraqis hanging, who, as a result, were slaughtered.

Now, with Qaddafi’s forces moving closer toward Benghazi, Libyans will not be as unlucky. A no-fly zone was always going to be the all-important factor in this bloody conflict. Yet, the conflict had, by the time of yesterday’s resolution, reached a point where a no-fly zone would have been too little too late, with Qaddafi checking the rebels’ westward progress and recapturing lost towns and cities in the rebel-controlled territories of the east.

Against all odds

Against all the odds, however, the Security Council went even further than a no-fly zone by implementing what Daniel Korski of the European Council on Foreign Relations had, three weeks ago, called the no-fly zone plus-one option: the use of air strikes to complement a no-fly zone that, on its own, would have merely sacrificed the exhausted and resource-diminished rebels to Qaddafi’s tanks and heavy artillery.

Although it may take a short while for the no-fly zone to be enforced, airstrikes can take place straightaway. They must start now, immediately and not later. Time is still of the essence: Qaddafi may now think twice about going into Benghazi will full force, since he risks having his planes and tanks destroyed, but not if there is even the slightest indication that it could be a number of days or weeks before the Security Council measures are implemented. How and when Qaddafi responds to yesterday’s measures will determine their effectiveness and the success of the uprising; It is, therefore, important that he is not given much choice.

Those who refused to back the UN resolution and oppose Western intervention in general are already being proven wrong: At the time of writing, Qaddafi’s regime had announced an immediate cease-fire, a markedly different stance to his previously defiant promise a week ago to take up arms against Western forces in the event of intervention. Nevertheless, the cease-fire announcement changes nothing. Reports suggest that Qaddafi’s forces continue to bombard rebel sites today and continue to inflict further casualties. As Western officials have rightly said, they’ll judge Qaddafi by his actions, not his words.

Devil in the details

The devil will, as always, be in the details. When the West does enforce the measures, the onus will turn on the Benghazi council and the rebels to organize themselves, operate around and take full advantage of the no-fly zone and Western airstrikes.

If Qaddafi decides to put his military march toward Benghazi on hold and instead tries to drain the rebels of their resources through a siege, then the West may have to consider providing them arms. Additionally, like many nascent opposition movements, the Benghazi council lacks depth, experience, and may suffer from internal disputes. At some point, they may require military advisers, who can impart lessons from the operational mistakes and successes of other rebel opposition groups elsewhere.

Nevertheless, the momentum has returned in their favor. Yesterday may be the day that won the conflict for the opposition; yesterday was also an example of diplomacy at its best and the international community uniting together to put humanity at the centre of attention. Prime Minister Cameron has ensured Britain and the West will, this time round, be on the right side of morality.

Kurdistan comes alive | openDemocracy | Ranj Alaaldin

Over the past few weeks the Kurdistan region of Iraq has hosted its own series of Arab-world inspired protests. They have been taking place since 17 February and have resulted in at least five deaths and more than 100 wounded. They present, in dramatic fashion, a fresh set of opportunities and challenges for the future of the region, its people and traditional power-holders the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the former the party of current Iraqi president Jalal Talabani and the latter of Kurdistan region president Massoud Barzani.

Kurdistan has now seen it all: umpteen anti-government uprisings throughout its history, civil war in the mid-1990s and liberation in 2003. In the post-Saddam era, stability and economic potential distinguished it as the ‘other Iraq’. Exciting and sparkling in the early years of post-2003 Iraq, that story had run its course and the Kurdish people have found themselves in a somewhat stagnated Kurdistan, stuck between the traditional KDP-PUK dominated Kurdistan with its age-old problems of corruption and rivalry with Baghdad, and the new and vibrant post-2003 Kurdistan that secured liberation from Saddam and offered potential riches.

Combined with the region’s opposition movement Gorran (Change), which controls 25 seats in the 111-member parliament, the protests have given Kurdistan a new lease of life. Yet, they are no new phenomena but an extension of past waves of protest. In 2006, for example, violent protests against government neglect took place in Halabja, the town that, 23 years ago today on March 16 1988, lost thousands when it fell victim to a poison gas attack. Additionally, just four months ago, students demonstrated in front of the ministry of higher education, attempted to storm the building and threw stones at the ministry building. More than their counterparts elsewhere in the region, the Kurds have already long embraced and exercised their right to protest.

What makes the protests different this time round is the fact that they take place against the backdrop of a cataclysmically modified middle east, one that has shifted the balance of power from government to citizen and one that allows citizen to hold government to account one way or another, even if that particular government has the capacity and willingness to violently suppress its people.

In Kurdistan, the setting is somewhat different: there is a democratically elected coalition government (KDP-PUK dominated) and a democratic process that has been recognised as being largely free and fair by the international community. The government also enjoys the support of the population. This is evidenced no less by the fact that the recent protests have been limited to Sulaymaniah province, a Gorran constituency and stronghold. There have been allegations of repression and police brutality in other major provinces like Erbil and the counter-argument is that protests could not, as a result, expand beyond Sulaymaniah, though many in the middle east have now demonstrated their willingness to rise up in defiance of the mass atrocities the Kurds have themselves all too often been subjected to.

Nevertheless, both pro- and anti-KRG individuals still have common grievances. Both bemoan the ongoing corruption, bureaucracy and lack of transparency. Moreover, both deride the overwhelming nepotism of the state, with most major posts being held by relatives of leading officials from one or the other dominant political parties.

By taking to the streets, protestors have re-ignited these feelings across the political, ideological and social spectrum in Kurdistan. They have brought a sense of urgency, and given impetus to the process of reform. This was markedly portrayed last week when, for the first time in Kurdish history, a sitting prime minister appeared before parliament to defend his government’s position and be called to account by lawmakers.

Members of parliament had an unprecedented opportunity to question their prime minister, Barham Salih, a deputy-leader of the PUK; they grilled him for no less than nine hours. The premier provided a poised performance that was strong in both its substance and conviction. He accordingly won a vote of confidence by outright majority, with MPs either satisfied by the performance or rueful of the fact that they were unable to counter his commanding performance.

The episode is significant for two key reasons: firstly, Prime Minister Salih received widespread backing across the political board since, despite expectations to the contrary, he was bold enough to directly and frankly acknowledge the shortcomings of the political system and the failures of the coalition government. Secondly, the episode was testament to the progressiveness of the political system in Kurdistan; it took the state closer towards firmly establishing a culture of law and accountability. Through his performance, Salih set a standard that future premiers will have to match, a task that may turn out to be both challenging and daunting.

The demonstrators are, therefore, starting to achieve their objectives, with no serious citizen expecting the state to fix everything overnight. There is, however, a smaller group of protestors and people in general who wish to see the downfall of the KDP-PUK government. But Kurdistan needs reform and not revolution. It does not need to undergo a process of wholesale deconstruction and reconstruction such as that experienced by the Iraqi state with such disastrous consequences after the removal of the Ba’ath regime.

As part of this process of reform, Gorran and others alike should also be called to account for their performances and, more crucially, expected to come up with solutions and proposals, rather than simple and superficial demands for ‘reform’ and ‘change’. As well as ministers dedicated to reform, Kurdistan also needs competent civil servants, who, in many cases, are incapable of performing even the most routine of tasks in an efficient and timely manner.

It is through this concerted effort that proper change and reform can be brought to Kurdistan, one that, for example, provides for independent and functioning institutions. Kurdistan has a respectable democratic process and some, albeit not sufficient, government accountability. Too much Kurdish blood has been shed for Kurdistan to come this far. These achievements should be built on, and not destroyed.

Libya: A no-fly zone won’t stop a massacre on the ground | Daily Telegraph | Ranj Alaaldin

Colonel Gaddafi may be winning. He has bided his time, tested the West’s resolve and is ready to take Libya back. Latest reports coming from Libya suggest the regime has re-captured the western town of Bin Jawad, just 30 miles from the strategic oil port of Ras Lanuf. At the time of writing it had been confirmed that, after intense fighting, the town of Zawiyah, 25 miles west of the capital Tripoli, had also fallen into regime hands.

Gaddafi’s strategy is clearer now: wait it out, regroup, and appraise the fighting and organisational ability of the rebels, as well as the West’s appetite for helping them through some form of intervention. He has not been disappointed. The rebels’ westward progress is being checked and the regime’s airpower has still not been eliminated, providing it with a strategic asset in the offensive against the rebels as well as a measure that, symbolically at least, starkly tells those close and distant to the regime that it is still the power it was before the uprising began.

The mood on the street is changing. In the early stages of the revolution Gaddafi was expected to fall within days. Now, it is being doubted whether he will fall at all, with the Economist, for example, describing how urban Libyans in Benghazi are still too frightened to fly the old flag from King Idris’s time.

The implications of this are as follows. First, it makes the chances of further and significant defections unlikely, least of all those officials who form part of Gaddafi’s elite group of revolutionaries and fanatics who have a vested interest in his survival.

Second, Libya may soon be on the verge of becoming divided into three groups: Gaddafi loyalists, anti-regime rebels and opportunists who will climb onto the bandwagon of the day.

Crucially, third, what this means for the international community and indeed Libyans, is that the much-debated no-fly zone will soon be rendered redundant. If the revolutionary tide is curtailed and the rebellion loses its momentum entirely, then a no-fly zone will do little to prevent the bloody onslaught against the rebels and civilian targets in their constituencies, particularly in the east.

So far, there has been stronger support for diplomatic measures, like isolating Gaddafi through engaging with the Benghazi council and providing it with organisational and humanitarian support. There have also been calls for a media counter-offensive, in light of Gaddafi’s own effective use of propaganda.

Yet, these measures will only be fruitful and have any significance if and when the rebel movement and the Benghazi council are able to consolidate their positions and keep hold of captured territory in the coming days and weeks. With Gaddafi unchecked and regaining territory, the prospects of them doing so are not promising.

Unlike Gaddafi, the rebels may end up being forced to go for broke. The international community has to prevent them from being forced into this position by enforcing a no-fly zone as soon as possible but also by combining this with the provisioning of arms to the rebels, since we may now be at a point where a no-fly zone will have little bearing on the conflict.

The international community remains indecisive as to what actions to take, fearful that intervention will undermine the indigenous nature of the revolution. Yet, it is inadvertently forcing itself into a position that will require it to choose between allowing the regime to embark on a mass killing spree as part of its revenge on the rebels, or direct military intervention through a sustained bombing campaign and the deployment of troops. In other words, with each day of inaction, the range of effective options both decreases and, militarily, looks more dangerous.

How Libya’s tribes will decide Gaddafi’s fate | Daily Telegraph | Ranj Alaaldin

Colonel Gaddafi has lost control over Libya’s tribes – they urgently need support, argues Ranj Alaaldin.

Win over the tribes, take the state: Colonel Gaddafi’s fate could be decided by Libya’s various tribal groups. Each is different to one another by virtue of their location, composition and their historic relationship with the regime. But each retains the same vital ability to either disrupt – or stabilise – the politics and security of the state. They should be taken seriously.

Like Saddam Hussein during his dictatorial reign, Gaddafi has cunningly played the tribal game. By offering economic privileges and fermenting intra-tribal rivalries – and combining these with a healthy doese of coercion – Gaddafi secured the loyalty of the tribes and fostered an effective network of patronage. He ensured that competing tribal groups were all represented in the army, so that he maintained his control over it and, by definition, the state. Oil revenues, meanwhile, enabled Gaddafi to spread the wealth among tribes and keep them tamed.

Libya’s biggest tribe, the Warfala, has switched sides to back the anti-government revolutionary groups. They are one million strong and dominant in the northern cities of Bani Walid, Tripoli and Benghazi. The Tarhuna, also nearly one million strong with around 350,000 followers in Tripoli, have followed suit.

Other significant tribes to have defected include the Zawiya, who have threatened to cut the flow of oil to Western countries unless the regime crackdown stops; the Zentan tribe; the Bani Walid; and the Obeidat tribe of Abdul-Fatah Younis, the former interior minister who sensationally defected and maintains he has proof that Gaddafi ordered the Lockerbie Bombing.

These various groups and their leaders have already played their part in the revolution by encouraging their “sons” to defect from the security forces and refuse orders to attack demonstrators. The oil-rich eastern region of Libya, for example, is now rebel-controlled territory. The lynchpin city of the regime, Tripoli, is yet to fall, but some of its districts have.

But the tribes can still do more with the right support. They will be pivotal if rebel numbers are to increase; they will need arms and organisational support. The international community, as it ponders over its options and the possibility of arming the opposition, often queries where arms should go if and when it takes this course of action: the tribes would be a good place to start.

Increased support for the tribes would also accelerate the downfall of the regime by persuading the other indecisive tribes to turn on Gaddafi and swell the ranks of the opposition. This includes the propped up and smaller Gaddafi tribe of the dictator himself; and the large Magarha tribe, located in the west of the country. The Magarha boasts Colonel Abdullah al-Sannussi as one of its own, the Gaddafi loyalist and powerful head of the Libyan internal and external security organisations.

Libyans are facing the possibility of a protracted conflict that destroys the social, political and security structures of the state. As a result, the tribes will be best-placed to provide social cohesiveness and a resilient social structure that can organise, mobilise and galvanise the people.

To make full and effective use of the tribes, Libyans and the international community should back the formation of a tribal council that, right now, integrates some 30 significant tribes more effectively and efficiently into the broader anti-Gaddafi strategy and, later, the post-Gaddafi Libyan reconstruction process.

This initiative would send a credible message of unity and certainty to the undecided pro-regime tribes concerned about where they may stand in a post-Gaddafi Libya, both politically and economically. It will convince them and other regime loyalists that Libya is moving on without Gaddafi.

LSE Director Sir Howard Davies has resigned over the Gaddafi funding controversy, here’s his resignation letter to Peter Sutherland, the university’s chairman of the Court of Governors:

Dear Peter,

When the reputational consequences for the LSE of accepting the donation from the GICDF (Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation) became clear, I offered to resign my position as director. You asked me to reconsider, and to talk first to the council. At its meeting on Tuesday the council offered me its support, and I was very grateful for that. But on reflection I have concluded that it would nonetheless be right for me to step down, even though I know that this will cause difficulty for the institution I have come to love.

The short point is that I am responsible for the school’s reputation, and that has suffered. I believe that the decisions we have made were reasonable, and can be justified. The grant from the foundation was used to support work on civil society in North Africa, which will have value in the future. The training programmes we have run in Libya will also prove valuable in enhancing the practical skills of many people who will be needed under whatever successor regime emerges. I should also say that I have no evidence whatsoever that anyone has behaved improperly in this whole episode. To the best of my current knowledge (though we are currently reviewing the evidence), the degrees to Saif Gaddafi were correctly awarded, and there was no link between the grant and the degrees.

But however laudable our intentions, in the light of developments in Libya the consequences have been highly unfortunate, and I must take responsibility for that. I advised the council that it was reasonable to accept the money, and that has turned out to be a mistake. There were risks involved in taking funding from sources associated with Libya, and they should have been weighed more heavily in the balance. Also, I made a personal error of judgment in accepting the British Government’s invitation to be an economic envoy, and the consequent Libyan invitation to advise their sovereign wealth fund. There was nothing substantive to be ashamed of in that (modest and unpaid) work, and I disclosed it fully, but the consequence has been to make it more difficult for me to defend the institution than it would otherwise have been.

So I think it would be better for the institution if we announce that I intend to step down. I know this will cause some short-term disruption, but I have concluded with great sadness that it is the right thing to do. I am of course willing to help with the transition in any way I can, and to stay on for a period of time if that is helpful. I am grateful to you and your predecessor Tony Grabiner for giving me the opportunity to lead this fine university, and I wish it every success in the future.

Yours ever Howard Davies

Weighing intervention in Libya | openDemocracy | Daniel Korski and Ranj Alaaldin

http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ranj-alaaldin-daniel-korski/weighing-intervention-in-libya

International organisations will never regain popular legitimacy if they continue their inaction over Libya. Intervention must be measured so as not to exacerbate the situation, but inaction is the worst course of all.

Colonel Gaddafi has made it clear: he will sacrifice his own people to stay in power. The constraints that other leaders have felt bound by as they faced peaceful protests are noticeably absent in Tripoli’s decision-making. Unless the international community acts now, the notable gains made by the Libyan uprising could be reversed, with consequences in Libya but also elsewhere in the middle east. A revanchist and isolated Libya led by Gaddafi will use its petro-dollars to throttle the nascent democracies in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt and wage war against its enemies.

But what can be done? The Security Council has already failed to address the situation, merely condemning Libya’s rulers for using force against peaceful demonstrators. It released a mere press statement on Tuesday that was unable to go further than condemnation – the diplomatic equivalent of a slap on the wrist – because of Russian and Chinese concerns that this was still an internal conflict and not yet grave enough to threaten the peace and security of the region – the UN Security Council’s official remit. The Human Rights Council has only just convened.

More shockingly, but nevertheless quite typically, the Security Council meeting only took place because the Libyan deputy representative at the UN, who had defected from the Libyan regime on Monday, requested it. Not one member of the Council itself made that request. The compromise on the text was only agreed when the Arab League issued their own sternly-worded statement, which gave Moscow and Beijing little choice.

There is still much to be done. First and foremost, direct military action should be ruled out, for now at least. Such a measure would aid the regime’s propagandistic efforts, could compound the humanitarian crisis on the ground and ultimately undermine the revolution in Libya and elsewhere. The endogenous nature of the ongoing revolutions in the middle east has given them their force; international military involvement could change this.

To hurt the regime and support the democratic uprising in Libya, the world can start by imposing sanctions that ensure the Libyan regime no longer benefits from its single greatest source of economic power – the energy sector: 95% of export revenue and 80% of government income come from oil revenues.

Additional sanctions could include asset freezes and travel bans on all Libyan officials and members of the security forces, which would send a signal to those officials who worry about their role in a post-Gaddafi Libya. Given the extensive holdings of the Gaddafi family, freezing assets will be a difficult and potentially lengthy process. However, it would send an important signal to the protesters, regime loyalists and other would-be Gaddafis in the region.

Thirdly, the West should push for an international investigation into the actions of Colonel Gaddafi and other members of his regime to determine their culpability in crimes against humanity. Ideally launched by the UN, the investigation could also be an ad hoc set-up involving Western, African and Arab jurists.

But this will still not be enough. Right now, Libyans desperately need a measure that limits Gaddafi’s capacity to kill his people in the coming days and weeks.

Whilst an invasion is on nobody’s agenda, Western powers should consider helping to enforce a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace that removes the regime’s ability to make use of its airpower, the all-significant and decisive instrument it still has at its disposal.

Getting a legal mandate will be difficult with the Security Council in deadlock and the historical record of no-fly zones, for example over Iraq, remaining contentious. But given Gaddafi’s indiscriminate targeting of civilians and the revulsion it has caused everywhere, it is not inconceivable that the Arab League or the African Union would shortly want to request the international community’s help in enforcing a no-fly zone. That, in turn, could give way to an innovative Nato-enabled airpower coalition, ideally led not by Western powers but by Arab states. The model must not be Nato’s Kosovo campaign or even the coalition assembled by George Bush Snr during the first Gulf War but rather the joint UN-AU mission in Sudan.

In preparing for this option, it is worth noting that the call for action over Libya is coming not from Western adventurists but from among the Arab population. It is an opportunity, therefore, to intervene against dictatorship in partnership and alongside the Arab people; an opportunity, that is, to bridge the divide that has marked the Western-Arab relationship over the last decade.

It is also worth bearing in mind that the West cannot help but influence events – non-intervention is an illusion. Indeed, it has already influenced events in a positive way. Former Prime Minister Tony Blair has been criticised for engaging with Gaddafi. Yet, were it not for Blair’s engagement with Gaddafi – which led to the regime’s dismantling of its WMD programme – we may have seen a mass atrocity of another kind taking place in the country. Unlike Saddam Hussein’s regime, which did possess the necessary weapons and stockpiles, the Libyan regime is unable to gas its own people and commit an atrocity similar to the 1988 Halabja genocide that killed at least 5,000 Kurds almost instantly.

It is high time for the West to exercise action and support the Libyan people.