For the peace and security of the world, all of us must take to the streets and stop these psychopaths, weather Zionist,Freemasonic or followers of the Party Ali, from dragging us into their apocalyptic delusions.

However, this does not imply that restrictions imposed on the above enumerated principles are absent in Kurdistan , or that the society enjoys über-freedom. After all we are discussing Kurdistan.

But in order to get a deeper insight of the function of the governing bodies in Kurdistan, we have to put Kurdistan in a context. So, when we compare Kurdistan with its neighbouring countries in several key areas, I think that Kurdistan outpace its neighbours in those areas (i.e., human rights records, freedom of expression, etc).

With this said, it does not mean that everything is “good” and no change is warranted. Heck, democracy is always about change and if the concept becomes static, it erodes itself. Therefore, I’m not against the increased dynamic in Kurdistan. Quite the opposite actually, I think that kurdistan Iraqs society is vivid and organised, this compounded with the increased number of middle class families, will stir the country in the right direction.

But this does not mean that trashing buildings, downgrading the infrastructure, etc., will help Kurdistan. This is only a uncivilised way of expressing grievance on, added to that is that it will only alienate the masses from the demonstrators, which will prevent their demands to surface.

Me and other Kurds cannot wait until the nepotism, corruption and mismanagement of resources that haunts the region are uprooted. But there are better ways of achieving this.

Firstly, you have to understand that space does not always permit me to go into details about any specific crimes or human rights abuses, unless of course the article is focused around any particular incident. My latest article on the protests in Kurdistan sought to assess the situation from an analytical perspective, rather than a journalistic one. In other words, the article intended to appraise whether Kurdistan needs revolution instead of reform. It argued for the latter and I am happy to discuss this with you and other readers.

Secondly, the points you mention are nothing unique. It is common knowledge that the PUK-KDP government is not fully unified and we all know about the events that unfolded during the civil war in the 1990s. Again, unless this was relevant to any article I write then it wouldn’t be included. Even if I was to insert it myself then it would undoubtedly be removed by the editor.

Third, at no point did I say there were no allegations of fraud. What I did say is that the international community declared the elections largely free and fair and not significantly tainted by fraud. This is in stark contrast to other nations like, for example, Egypt and Afghanistan.

I am sure the security forces did suppress the protests to some extent or another, as I have maintained in my articles. The issue is the extent to which they were suppressed. Clearly people were not brutalised in the same manner Libyans were during their anti-government protests. Thanks for providing more information about the violent attacks, including the attacks on the Gorran MPs. I will seek to document these in my next article. When I wrote my recent article these were either not documented sufficiently or had not taken place.

I think we have to be careful about looking at internal party politics as the same thing as a democratic process that gives the population the power to choose their MPs and respective leaders. Granted that the KDP has not seen much internal movement over the years but that has more to do with the way the party is structured and the understanding therein of those who choose to be a part of it.

Unlike the KDP, the PUK has seen its upper echelons shaken, most notably by Nawshirwan Mustafa when he defected from the party to form opposition group Gorran. The question in the case of both the PUK and the KDP is whether leaders like Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani can be challenged and undermined by those within their parties should they choose to take this route: the answer is yes and we’ve seen this happen over the years albeit with different degrees within each party and certainly with different degrees of exposure. Don’t forget, most of the PUK infighting is done in the public eye whilst the KDP has been more careful to keep internal disputes away from the media and public domain in general.

I haven’t suggested the system is perfect and, in fact, I’ve iterated all of the problems you mention (categorised as corruption, nepotism, bureaucracy, etc). In this respect, yes, Kurdistan’s problems can be paralleled with other countries in the region. However, I would most certainly say that Kurdistan is no where near as bad as others in the region; you compare Kurdistan to dictatorial regimes in the region but which of these states have the same respected democratic system with a respected and prominent opposition? And the international community would not declare elections in Kurdistan largely free and fair it wasn’t or just because the Kurds are Western allies, as exemplified by its position toward Egypt’s shambolic elections back in December.

I’m glad you mentioned the issue of nepotism in your closing comments. My view is that, in light of the changing dynamics in the region and the ongoing protests in Kurdistan, it is difficult for the parties to position their sons and daughters as future leaders. This is save for the one or two individuals who have already established themselves in the political environment. At the same time, if there are individuals who are dedicated to reform and taking Kurdistan forward, then they should be judged on the basis of these merits, rather than their relations. Let’s not forget that even in the West we have sons and daughters of former leaders/politicians who have been and are in positions of power.