Ranj Alaaldin

Reuters reports two bomb attacks in northern Iraq where a contingency of US troops are expected to return and support a military campaign against the still-strong insurgency there and, additionally, to act as a buffer between the Kurds and Arabs who continue to face up to each other with full-blown violence only one small exchange away (see Guardian article here).

On the one hand, PM Maliki might see the area as dispensable given that he enjoys virtually no support there (it was, for example, counter-intuitive to have US troops leave N.Iraq and places like Mosul in the first place). On the other, however, the August 19 attacks in Baghdad – now named Iraq’s “9/11″ – showed that Sunni militants could possess the capacity to strike other parts of the country, hence the need to dismantle their bases in the north. Maliki’s main campaign platform will be security come January’s national elections – volatility in the north dictates the return of US troops there first; other areas further down south would have to suffer further attacks of great magnitude before Maliki gets desperate enough to bring US forces in.

Today’s attacks killed at least 15 and wounded 37. They took place in Shirqat and Sinjar. Northern Iraq (excluding Kurdistan) could be the most impoverished and neglected part of the country; it is at the centre of the disputed territories dispute between the KRG and Baghdad.

ISCI leader Sayid Abdul Aziz al-Hakim was given a funeral ceremony in front of the Iraqi Embassy in Tehran this morning. His body was then transferred to the holy city of Qom prior to transferring it to Basra in Iraq where a formal funeral ceremony will be held. Al-Iraqiyah news channel reported the presence of Iraqi and Iranian officials. His son, Ammar al-Hakim, is expected to take over. It is unlikely that a change will take place with regard to the current IISC leaders who include Adil Abd-al-Mahdi; Humam Hammudi; Baqir Sulagh; and Hadi al-Amiri.

Here’s a detailed obituary from the Guardian:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/27/abdul-aziz-al-hakim-obituary

The same news report also noted Kurdistan Region President Massud Barzani’s condolences. It remains to be seen whether al-Hakim’s death will dent the KRG/ISCI partnership that seeks a completely decentralised Iraq. ISCI has campaigned for a federal “super” Shia south akin to the Kurdistan model.

Analysts suggest this dream is now gone in light of the January provincial election results which, according to them, showed a staunch preference for a centralised Iraq.

This might hold water to some extent, but the fact is that although Maliki’s centrist coalition fared well in the elections, it didn’t achieve a dominant win; it only narrowly beat federalist ISCI. Moreover, voting patterns showed that ethnic and sectarian affiliations still dictate which way the electorate votes and as such Kurds in the north voted Kurd, Sunnis in the middle voted Sunni, while Shias in the south voted Shia. The federalist argument therefore still stands but it will be interesting to see how things turn out come the national elections in January 2010, now that Maliki’s Dawa will not be part of the Shia coalition and is set to form a national coalition made up of representative Sunni Arab and Kurdish parties. Of course, this might not happen; it’s still too early to know anything for definite.

The Shia bloc contesting the country’s elections in January, the United Iraqi Alliance (now called Iraqi National Alliance) was to be led by Al-Hakim. Senior ISCI leader, cleric and parliamentarian, Humam al-Hamudi will do so instead

This article appeared yesterday on the Guardian UK site. It was written and submitted before the death of ISCI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, hence the absence of any in-depth analysis of its implications for the Iraqi political landscape – something that merits its own separate piece.

Maliki's bold move

Guardian UK, 26 August 2009

The United Iraqi Alliance, a slate of predominantly Shia Muslim parties that became the leading bloc in parliament after Iraq's 2005 elections,has regrouped and renamed itself the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) to contest the country's national elections in January 2010.

The amalgamation follows months of wrangling and negotiations over the composition of the coalition, the distribution of seats and positions of power (which, according to sources, still remains unresolved).

However, there is one very significant absentee: prime minister Nouri al-Maliki's Islamic Dawa party, which will instead form a secular and cross-sectarian alliance that builds on the group's electoral success in the provincial elections last January.

Beyond any personal ramifications it may have for Maliki's political career, the development potentially signals a new stage in Iraqi politics. Iraq may be breaking the dark strictures of sectarian politics to make its way toward becoming a fully functioning pluralistic democracy no longer impeded by a loyalty-based electoral system in which votes are dictated by religious or ethnic affiliations.

Maliki's decision to part ways is certainly a bold one dictated by the INA's reluctance to guarantee him another term in office and, possibly, its refusal to accept the new political reality that allows Dawa to demand a higher proportion of parliamentary seats than other groups. Looking at the January provincial election results, his State of Law coalition (formed for the provincial elections), although emerging strongest, only narrowly beat groups like the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). It won only two small majorities in Baghdad and Basra. A breakdown of the results shows that he would have won fewer votes and fewer seats had he been up against the newly formed Shia coalition.

But if anybody can beat the odds, it is Maliki. Having come in from obscurity in 2006 to become prime minister as a compromise candidate, he has since exceeded expectations and emerged as a strong leader with a number of credentials to his name, thanks largely to security crackdowns across the ethnic and sectarian board and diplomatic hard-headedness with the Americans. Although January's provincial elections may not have given him a dominant win, they did nevertheless consolidate his power and popularity.

Reports suggest that Maliki will join forces with the powerful Anbar sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, leader of the Anbar Awakening front that controls the local provincial council. If Maliki is to perform well in Sunni-dominated areas he will need respected Sunni figures like Abu Risha. Other natural allies could include the powerful anti-Kurdistan regional government Ba'athist group, al-Habda, which heads Mosul provincial council.

By forging alliances with prominent, representative political groups and perhaps the new Kurdish opposition party, Change, Maliki could lead the country's first credible and truly national coalition; one that he may bill as a coalition of "champions" that makes the INA look like a grouping of washed-up parties coalesced around sectarian ideals. Moreover, the INA may have difficulty selling itself as an alternative to the current Maliki government given that its leading party, ISCI, has been a key part of it.

Should he manage to forge such an alliance, Maliki could present a more-than-respectable challenge to the INA. However, he still has to allay potential partners' concerns about his over-concentration of power; additionally, he will have to reassure voters with an improvement in security – his number one campaign platform.

Maliki could also entice defections within the INA between now and January, particularly if a strong coalition was to be pitched. Potential Maliki allies within the INA include the Sadrists, known for their retractions and reversals, and who themselves have previously mooted a national and cross-sectarian coalition.

To Maliki's advantage, it is still unclear how the relationship between the centrist Sadrists and the federalist ISCI will play out. The two have a history of competition and violent confrontation that has resulted in some of the most dangerous periods of post-2003 Iraq; their participation in the INA may have been ordered by Iran, where Moqtada al-Sadr is currently in self-exile. Nor is it clear how things will pan out now that influential ISCI leader, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, has died.

Events after the election could be just as significant as events before. The INA may still need a coalition to govern should it win and might therefore turn to Maliki. Alternative partners like the Kurds, strengthened by the Shia divisions, might demand concessions that make any coalition with them unrealistic.

At this point it would be counter-intuitive to rule anything out since there is still some time left until the elections. Iraqi politics is known for being a tumultuous affair where the line between friend and foe is a blurry one. Political convenience may have dictated the current state of affairs but any intra-Shia division that takes Iraq away from sectarian politics is a victory for the average Iraqi.

This should not encourage complacency, though. If last Wednesday'sattacks had the hand of government insiders, which (despite the less-than-convincing televised confession of the alleged perpetrator) they probably did, then division among powerful, power-hungry, armed entities is not exactly assuring.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/aug/26/iraq-maliki-coalition

Like Juan Cole, Jonathan Steel writing here for the Guardian also advises reconciliation with disgruntled Sunni Arabs if future attacks are to be prevented. But, again, what if the discontent among the Sunni Arab community and the Sunni insurgency is more to do with a refusal to accept that they no longer dominate the seats of power than anything else? Cole refers to this but fails to provide a remedy.

Do we really want to reward Sunni militants? Steel and Cole’s analysis could be deemed apologetic to the atrocities committed by the Sunni insurgency, and conducive to an environment of terror and coercion.

Juan Cole provides good analysis here in his latest post on Iraq. He makes a few mistakes, however.

1. Mr Cole states that “these bombings are a sign that elements in the Sunni Arab community are not reconciled to the rise of Shiite and Kurdish rule over Iraq.” Yet, for his conclusion maintains that “the solution is for the Obama administration to play hard ball with al-Maliki in getting him to pursue national reconciliation.”

The problem here is that any national reconciliation attempt by Maliki would be futile if indeed the problem, as Mr Cole suggests, is at the outset the Sunni Arab failure to accept the reality that they no longer dominates the seats of power, since the actual remedy for this would be to give the Sunnis an unjust increase in powers that overrides those constitutionally and equitably afforded to other groups like the Shias and Kurds.

2. Mr Cole states that “Sunni Arabs would not benefit from any kind of partition, even soft partition, since they don’t have any developed hydrocarbon fields in their part of Iraq.”

Not exactly, given that the Iraqi constitutional explicitly provides for the country’s resources to be allocated across regions and governorates on a per capita basis. This mistake is made all to often by Iraq commentators – a misperception among many that inflate Sunni/Shia/Kurd tensions.

3. Mr Cole states “If, in turn, the main problem is that al-Maliki is pursuing a vendetta with elements of the Sunni Arab nationalist leadership, and they are lashing back out at him, then a return to having US troops patrol Baghdad would not in fact resolve the problem. They might be able to make big bombings harder. But these bombings have been going on since 2003, and many big sanguinary explosions were set off under the nose of US troops all through those 6 years. Especially if this is a political struggle, a short-term US military would not be the right solution.”

Indeed, bombings have continued. But it’s been some time since we last saw in Baghdad an attack of such sophistication and magnitude as the one on Wednesday. Such attacks may have been expected in the volatile north, but to have them take place in some of the most securest areas of Baghdad does not say much about the Iraqi army’s ability to assume the business of security.

That they were able to get so close to the ministries gives plausibility to allegations that the terrorists had inside help: how else does one get up to 30ft near a ministry with a lorry packed full of explosives? Iraqi manned checkpoints cannot therefore be trusted at this point.
The Iraqi security forces, it should be noted, is still as sectarian as if not more sectarian than the Iraqi population itself.